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Revisiting the “Content-of-Laws” Enquiry in 
International Arbitration 
Soterios Loizou* 
Establishing the content of the applicable law is one of the most 
important, albeit seldom examined, topics in the theory and practice of 
international arbitration. Setting as the point of departure the regulatory 
vacuum in nearly all national laws on international arbitration, this study 
examines in depth this “content-of-laws” enquiry in an attempt to foster 
doctrinal integrity, legal certainty, and predictability in arbitral proceedings. 
Specifically, this study encompasses a three level analysis of the topic. 
Firstly, it explores the theoretical underpinnings and the various approaches 
articulated in legal theory to the establishment of the content of the 
applicable law in international litigation and arbitration. Secondly, on the 
basis of an elaborate comparative review of the various legal regimes and 
jurisprudence in the most frequently selected venues of arbitration, namely 
England & Wales, France, Hong Kong, Singapore, Switzerland, the State 
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of New York (USA), and Sweden, as well as in leading investment 
arbitration fora, it challenges conventional wisdom by showcasing the 
emerging trend toward the application of a “facultative” jura novit arbiter 
principle in international arbitral proceedings. Thirdly, it delineates a clear 
modus operandi for arbitral tribunals and national courts reviewing arbitral 
awards in annulment proceedings and offers model clauses, arbitration rules, 
and national law provisions on the content-of-laws enquiry. The study 
concludes with some final remarks and observations that amplify the 
importance of continuous governing law related consultations between the 
parties and the arbitrators throughout the arbitral proceedings and, certainly, 
before the tribunal has rendered its final award. 
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Σύρος 
“ . . . ἐν παντὶ δεῖ 
καιρῷ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπικρατεῖν ἁπανταχοῦ, 
καὶ τὸν παρατυγχάνοντα τούτου τοῦ 
μέρους 
ἔχειν πρόνοιαν· κοινόν ἐστι τῷ βίῳ 
πάντων.” 
 
[Syriscus 
“ . . . At all times 
And in all regions Justice should prevail, 
And, in the common interest of 
mankind, 
‘Tis the concern of all who pass to see 
Justice upheld.”]1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The method of establishing the content of the applicable law is one of 
the most important, albeit seldom examined, topics in the theory and 
practice of international arbitration. In stark contrast to the abundance of 
publications relating to international arbitration, only a handful of scholars 
have attempted to shed light on this dark corner of alternative dispute 
resolution and to systematize the plethora of different approaches to the 
ascertainment of the content of the applicable law in international arbitral 
proceedings.2 
                                                                                                             
 1. THE ARBITRATION: THE EPITREPONTES OF MENANDER 40 (Gilbert Murray 
trans., 1945). 
 2. As uniquely put by Professor Park, “Many trees have been felled to make 
paper for articles on how to find facts, [but] . . . [l]ess attention has been paid to 
the arbitrator’s truth-seeking function with respect to legal norms.” William W. 
Park, Arbitrators and Accuracy, 1 J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 25, 42 (2010). 
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Notwithstanding the limited attention in legal scholarship, which has 
resulted, among other factors, from the fallacy that conflict-of-laws do not 
fit with international arbitration,3 the method of establishing the content of 
the applicable law could alter the legal basis and, as a consequence, 
determine the outcome of the dispute. The importance of this so-called 
“content-of-laws”4 enquiry is vividly illustrated in the following example: 
Party A and Party B entered into an international agreement for 
the distribution of heart rate monitors in Ruritania. The 
distribution agreement contained an arbitration clause for the 
resolution of all disputes arising from or in connection with the 
agreement. Following the unilateral termination of the contract by 
B, A filed a motion to initiate arbitral proceedings for breach of 
the distribution agreement. Both A and B made legal submissions 
on contract law grounds.5 
This theoretical example raises a series of content-of-laws-related questions: 
who bears the burden of establishing the content of the applicable rules? 
Does it fall on the parties or the arbitral tribunal? Is the tribunal limited by 
the arguments of the parties? Should it look beyond the submissions of the 
latter? What should the tribunal do if the parties have overlooked any 
relevant rules? Particularly under this latter scenario, what is the effect of 
any overriding mandatory rules on goodwill indemnity on the law applicable 
to the dispute?6 Depending on the approach adopted to the content-of-laws 
enquiry, the outcome of this dispute could vary significantly. 
Be that as it may, it might be argued that the importance of the 
content-of-laws enquiry is limited to the realm of academic curiosity, as 
parties usually retain legal counsel and make detailed legal submissions at 
the tribunal’s request. Reality, however, is different, as clearly evidenced 
in the seminal Soh Beng Tee & Co. v. Fairmount Development case from 
Singapore in which the power of the arbitral tribunal to introduce sua 
                                                                                                             
 3. For an informative overview of the interplay between conflict-of-laws 
and international arbitration, see, for example, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Kröll eds., 2011). 
 4. Note the distinction between “conflict-of-laws” enquiries whereby the 
adjudicator explores which law is applicable, and “content-of-laws” enquiries whereby 
the adjudicatory strives to ascertain what the identified applicable law provides for. 
 5. This example is loosely based on the seminal case Werfen Austria GmbH 
v. Polar Electro Europe B.V., Korkein oikeus [KKO] [Supreme Court] 2008:77 
(Fin.), http://www.finlex.fi/fi/oikeus/kko/kko/2008/20080077#aOT20080077_3 
[https://perma.cc/KDA7-T34C]. 
 6. Cf. Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Techs., Inc., C-381/98, 2000 E.C.R. 
I-9325. 
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sponte additional legal arguments constituted the central issue of 
annulment proceedings: 
This appeal follows in the wake of a 44–day arbitration hearing 
that engendered 1,766 pages of transcripts and a 110–page award 
dated 15 March 2006 (“the Award”). In the course of the 
arbitration proceedings, the appellant, Soh Beng Tee & Company 
Pte Ltd (“SBT”) and the respondent, Fairmount Development Pte 
Ltd (“Fairmount”) had filed over 200 pages of pleadings, 
cumulatively examined 14 witnesses, and submitted at least 696 
pages of written arguments.7 
Acknowledging the paramount importance of the topic for doctrinal 
integrity, legal certainty, and predictability, this Article navigates the 
approaches articulated in legal theory and followed in legal practice in an 
attempt to identify a transnational legal standard or best practices for 
arbitral proceedings. Specifically, the analysis begins with an overview of 
the content-of-laws enquiry in international litigation. In light of the 
fundamental principle of jura novit curia, Part I defines and demarcates 
the concepts of “domestic” and “foreign” laws. Part II sets out the core 
methods followed by national courts in the application of foreign law. Part 
III delves into the sui generis cosmos of international arbitration and, 
specifically, the content-of-laws enquiry in legal theory. Having set the 
scene with an overview of the two-tier procedural framework of arbitral 
proceedings—namely, party autonomy and the relevant national law on 
arbitration, that is, lex arbitri—the analysis explores the so-called 
“fall-back,” the inquisitorial, adversarial, and, finally, “hybrid” approaches 
to the issue. Part IV continues with an elaborate comparative review of the 
content-of-laws enquiry in the practice of the most frequently selected venues 
of arbitration,8 unveiling caselaw trends and patterns in various civil law and 
common law jurisdictions as well as investment arbitration fora. The synthesis 
of the findings reveals an emerging trend toward the application of a 
“dormant” or “potentially inquisitorial” approach, amounting to the 
application of a facultative jura novit arbiter principle in international 
arbitration. Part V concludes with an attempt to establish a lex ferenda for 
                                                                                                             
 7. Soh Beng Tee & Co. v. Fairmount Dev., [2007] SCCA 28, [1] (Sing.). 
 8. QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF LONDON & WHITE & CASE LLP, 2015 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: IMPROVEMENTS AND INNOVATIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 12 (2015), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/16 
4761.pdf (listing, in this order, England and Wales, France, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Switzerland, the State of New York in the United States of America, and Sweden as 
the most frequently selected arbitration venues) [https://perma.cc/5QPF-HEJ8]. 
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the content-of-laws enquiry by firstly delineating the optimal rules of a 
hybrid approach to the ascertainment of the content of the applicable law 
in international arbitration and secondly offering model clauses, 
arbitration rules, and national law provisions on the content-of-laws 
enquiry. 
I. MEETING THE LATINS: JURA NOVIT CURIA, LEX FORI, AND LEX ALIENA 
It is important to begin by briefly examining two points that will set 
the foundations for the analysis that follows: the jura novit curia principle 
and the crucial distinction between domestic and foreign laws. 
Pursuant to the general principle of jura novit curia, which is also 
referred to as “iura novit curia,”9 the court knows—or, at least, is 
presumed to know—the law. Hence, the laws of the respective forum are 
put on par with the laws of other legal orders in that the judge is presumed 
to be cognizant of their content and required to apply the law without 
assistance from the litigating parties. In juxtaposition with Friedrich Carl 
von Savigny’s idea of equality of domestic and foreign laws,10 however, 
the adage jura novit curia has not risen yet to the status of a universal 
principle. Accordingly, the various fora may be classified into two broad 
groups: (1) fora that are presumed to know equally domestic and foreign 
laws; and (2) fora adhering to a limited jura novit curia principle, which 
requires that only domestic law be ascertained and applied ex officio by 
the judge.11 
This distinction accentuates the importance of the second point 
examined herein, that is, the classification of rules into domestic and 
foreign laws. The two concepts may be demarcated only in concreto, that 
is, in reference to a particular state, and may be defined in a positive and 
negative manner respectively. Domestic law comprises the entirety of the 
regulations enacted by the national legislator, international treaties, and 
other legal documents ratified by the respective state; the primary and 
                                                                                                             
 9. “The court knows the law.” 
 10. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
AND THE LIMITS OF THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND TIME 69–70, 76 
(William Guthrie trans., 2d ed. 1880). 
 11. See Masanori Kawano, Court Responsibilities for Determining Foreign 
Law, in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT LITIGATION, ARBITRATION AND JUDICIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES 221, 222 (Rolf Stürner & 
Masanori Kawano eds., 2011) (“As far as the domestic cases are concerned 
investigating and determining the appropriate legal rule, which applies to the 
particular case is commonly regarded as one of the most important responsibilities 
of the court. They are investigated ex officio.”). 
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secondary legislation of international organizations that the state is 
member of; as well as the application of such national or international rules 
by the judiciary of the state or other competent international bodies and 
tribunals. Conversely, foreign law consists of all national and international 
rules that do not form part of domestic law.12 
Having clarified the meaning of these fundamental concepts of 
international civil procedure and conflict-of-laws, this Article can delve 
into the “content-of-laws” enquiry in international commercial litigation 
and arbitration. 
II. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION AND FOREIGN LAW 
The initiatives for the unification of the various national regimes on 
the application of foreign law have been rather anemic.13 In addition, all 
                                                                                                             
 12. Cf. Louise Ellen Teitz, From the Courthouse in Tobago to the Internet: 
The Increasing Need to Prove Foreign Law in US Courts, 34 J. MAR. L. COM. 97, 
98 (2003) (“In a [United States] federal court, ‘foreign,’ means of another country, 
not of a sister state.”). 
 13. This paucity of initiatives pertaining to the application of foreign law is in 
stark contrast to the momentum built with regard to projects on the facilitation of 
access to the content of foreign law. Notable examples of special instruments on the 
access to foreign law are the European Convention on Information on Foreign Law, 
June 7, 1968, E.T.S. No. 62, together with the Additional Protocol to the European 
Convention on Information on Foreign Law, Mar. 15, 1978, E.T.S. No. 97, and the 
Inter-American Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law, Aug. 5, 
1979, O.A.S. T.S. No. 53 (“Montevideo Convention”). For a continuously updated 
list of the 1968 London Convention Contracting States, including the declared 
Reservations, see Details of Treaty No. 062, TREATY OFFICE, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/062 (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/SVL4-EVW6], and for the Additional Protocol, see 
Details of Treaty No. 097, TREATY OFFICE, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://www.coe.int 
/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/097 (last visited Jan. 24, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/5N6W-8YVK]. For a continuously updated list of the 1979 
Montevideo Convention Contracting States, including the declared Reservations, see 
Inter-American Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law, DEPT. OF 
INT’L LAW, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-43.html (last visisted Jan. 24, 
2018) [https://perma.cc/3F7Z-2F6W]. For recommendations and means of accessing 
the content of foreign law, see Philippe Lortie & Maja Groff, The Missing Link 
between Determining the Law Applicable and the Application of Foreign Law: 
Building on the Results of the Joint Conference on Access to Foreign Law in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (Brussels, 15-17 February 2012), in A COMMITMENT TO 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HANS VAN LOON 325 (The 
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law ed., 
2013). In the context of the European Union (“EU”), see Council Regulation No. 
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relevant projects on both regional and global levels have been 
discontinued—at least for the foreseeable future.14 Such a stalemate is 
evidenced clearly in the Report on the Meeting: Feasibility Study on the 
Treatment of Foreign Law of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law: “[The] experts concluded that there should be no 
attempt to comprehensively harmonise the different approaches to the 
treatment of foreign law, as there is no need or likelihood of success for 
harmonisation.”15 
As a consequence, the largely inconsistent national regimes on the 
ascertainment of the content and the application of foreign law have been 
                                                                                                             
1259/2010 of December 20, 2010 (EU), implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation (Rome III), Recital 14 
(“Where the law of another Member State is designated, the network created by 
Council Decision 2001/470/EC of May 28, 2001 (EU) establishing a European 
Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters, could play a part in assisting the 
courts with regard to the content of foreign law.”). Note, also, European Commission 
and the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Access to Foreign Law in Civil 
and Commercial Matters: Conclusions and Recommendations, Recommendation 4 
(2012) (“The conference confirms that any global instrument in this field should focus 
on the facilitation of access to foreign law and should not attempt to harmonise the status 
of foreign law in national procedures.”). Lastly, due consideration should be given to the 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Chief Justice of New South Wales and the 
Chief Judge of the State of New York on References of Questions of Law (Dec. 20, 
2010), http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes/nswsc_pc.nsf/pages/538 [https: 
//perma.cc/CUS7-966H], and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Supreme Court of Singapore and the Supreme Court of New South Wales on References 
of Questions of Law (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/practice_notes 
/nswsc_pc.nsf/pages/529 [https://perma.cc/XAF6-666E]. Cf. UNIF. CERT. QUEST. LAW 
ACT, 95 U.L.A. (1995), particularly §§ 2–3, which allow for information requests 
regarding an individual State’s law in the United States by Canadian and Mexican courts. 
 14. The exception being Carlos Esplugues et al., Project JLS/CJ/2007-1/03, 
Valencia Report: General Report on the Application of Foreign Law by Judicial 
and Non-Judicial Authorities in Europe, in APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW 3 
(Carlos Esplugues, José Luis Iglesias & Guillermo Palao eds., 2011), and the 
accompanying Principles for a Future EU Regulation on the Application of 
Foreign Law (“The Madrid Principles”) (Madrid, Colegio Nacional de 
Registradores de España, February 2010), in APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW, 
supra, at 95. 
 15. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Feasibility Study on the 
Treatment of Foreign Law: Report on the Meeting of 23-24 February 2007, 
prepared by the Permanent Bureau, Preliminary Document No. 21A of March 
2007 for the attention of the Council of April 2007 on General Affairs and Policy 
of the Conference, at 3, https://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_pd21ae2007 
.pdf (emphasis added) [https://perma.cc/FYG6-E8GG]. 
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preserved. Such inconsistencies nullify the legal certainty and predictability 
achieved under uniform conflict-of-laws instruments because, depending on 
the forum, different substantive rules might be ascertained and eventually 
applied to the very same dispute.16 With that in mind, it is clear that this 
niche topic in private international law and international civil procedure 
arises as a factor of paramount importance for the establishment of a level 
playing field in international trade. 
There is a wide spectrum of approaches to the ascertainment of the 
content and the application of foreign law by national courts. As 
eloquently put in the ILA Report & Recommendations on “Ascertaining 
the Contents of the Applicable Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration,”17 at the two extremes of the spectrum, one may find “[fora 
whereby] the court has considerable powers to apply foreign law and to 
ascertain its contents on its own motion . . . [and fora whereby] the court 
is required essentially to rely on the initiative of the parties to plead and 
prove foreign law as if it were a factual matter.”18 This distinction 
corresponds with the legal treatment of foreign law as “law” and foreign 
law as “facts,” respectively.19 In between these two positions, there are 
“intermediate systems . . . where pleading foreign law primarily rests with 
                                                                                                             
 16. Notably, in the context of the European Union, see Commission Staff 
Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Decisions and Authentic Instruments in Matters of Successions and 
on the Introduction of a European Certificate of Inheritance: Impact Assessment 
COM (2009) 154 final, SEC (2009) 411, SEC (2009) 410 final, at 32 (Sept. 14, 
2009) (“[Notwithstanding the unification of the conflict-of-laws rules] different law 
may still be applied to a succession due to different requirements to pleading and 
proof of foreign law.”). 
 17. International Law Association (“ILA”), International Commercial Arbitration 
Committee’s Report and Recommendations on Ascertaining the Contents of the 
Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 73 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 
850 (Aug. 2008) [hereinafter ILA Report & Recommendations]. 
 18. Id. at 861. Notable examples of countries following the “foreign law as 
legal rules” approach are Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. Notable 
examples of countries following the “foreign law as facts” approach are Argentina, 
Australia, Cyprus, India, Ireland, Israel, Luxemburg, Malta, South Africa, Spain, 
and all constituent systems of the United Kingdom.  
 19. JEFFREY WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 1057–58 (2012). 
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the parties and where responsibility with regard to ascertaining its contents 
is divided between the court and the parties.”20 
Granted, national legal orders only seldom adopt one of the two 
extreme positions. Either they provide for special rules, which water down 
the “doctrinal purity” of the extreme approaches,21 or, most frequently, 
legal practice—as evidenced in caselaw—blurs the picture so that the 
classification of the particular legal system becomes nearly impossible. 
Finally, for the sake of completeness, a number of jurisdictions have no 
relevant rules on the legal treatment of foreign law rules22 but approach all 
foreign law issues on a case-by-case basis.23  
  
                                                                                                             
 20. ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 861. Notable 
examples of countries following this “intermediate approach” are China, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, and the United States of America.  
 21. Typical examples of such special rules are those allowing only limited appellate 
review of judgments for incorrect interpretation and/or application of the applicable 
foreign law and rules expanding the limited jura novit curia principle to laws of other 
foreign jurisdictions. For these two examples, see, for example, RICHARD FENTIMAN, 
FOREIGN LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS: PLEADING, PROOF AND CHOICE OF LAW 246–47 
(1998); SOFIE GEEROMS, FOREIGN LAW IN CIVIL LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 251–359 (2004). 
 22. Most prominently, Japan. Contra ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, SUEO IKEHARA 
& NORMAN JENSEN, AMERICAN-JAPANESE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 
(1964) (“Japanese courts will usually take judicial notice of an applicable foreign 
law . . . .” (citing also caselaw deviating from their proposition)). 
 23. Kawano, supra note 11, at 224–25. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:  
THE CONTENT-OF-LAWS ENQUIRY IN THEORY 
A. Setting the Scene 
Unlike court proceedings, in the context of international arbitration, 
no such distinction exists between domestic and foreign law.24 Other than 
the indirect selection of the basic procedural framework—as determined 
by the lex arbitri25—that is affected by locating the seat of the tribunal in 
                                                                                                             
 24. ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 866; Christian P. Alberti, 
Iura Novit Curia in International Commercial Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: SYNERGY, CONVERGENCE 
AND EVOLUTION: LIBER AMICORUM ERIC BERGSTEN 3, 14 (Stefan Kröll et al. eds., 
2011); CLYDE CROFT, CHRISTOPHER KEE & JEFFREY WAINCYMER, A GUIDE TO THE 
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES 403 (2013); Gisela Knuts, Jura Novit Curia and the 
Right to Be Heard—An Analysis of Recent Case Law, 28 ARB. INT’L 669, 672 (2012); 
JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 444 (2003); WAINCYMER, supra note 19, 
at 105; see also Teresa Isele, The Principle Iura Novit Curia in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 13 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 14, 16 (2010) (“[In the context of 
international arbitration] it is dogmatically already quite difficult to say that any law is 
‘foreign’ at all.”); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, 
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1313, 1331 (2003) (“An arbitral tribunal has no lex fori 
and hence no ‘foreign’ law. Or differently put, it has only foreign law.”). Contra Rolf 
A. Schütze, Die Bestimmung des anwendbaren Rechts im Schiedsverfahren und die 
Feststellung seines Inhalts, in LAW OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LIBER AMICORUM KARL-HEINZ BÖCKSTIEGEL 
715, 722 (Robert Briner et al. eds., 2001) (“Ausländisches Recht ist damit das Recht, 
das nicht mit dem Recht am Schiedsort übereinstimmt.” [“Foreign law is, therefore, 
the law that does not correspond with the law at the seat of the arbitral tribunal.”]); 
Tibor Varady, Application of Foreign Law by Non-Judicial Authorities, in HAGUE-
ZAGREB ESSAYS 2: PRODUCT LIABILITY, ROAD TRANSPORT, FOREIGN LAW 204, 212 
(T.M.C. Asser Inst. ed., 1978) (“The first specific dilemma with regard to the 
application of foreign law in international commercial arbitration, is, which law can 
be regarded as foreign.”). For an interesting distinction in English law, see NEIL 
ANDREWS, II ANDREWS ON CIVIL PROCESSES: VOLUME II, MEDIATION AND 
ARBITRATION 365 (2013) (distinguishing English law from “foreign” law, that is, non-
English law, for the application of § 69 of the English Arbitration Act of 1996). 
 25. JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY & KETILBJØRN HERTZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 
AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN, EUROPEAN, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 824 (3d ed. 2011) (“[T]he lex arbitri serves as a kind of public-
law ‘umbrella’ which the State concerned holds over the [otherwise private] arbitral 
process.”). 
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a particular country26—thus, lex loci arbitri27—it cannot be sensibly 
argued that an arbitral tribunal has its own substantive law regime.28 
                                                                                                             
 26. GARY B. BORN, II INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1602 (2d ed. 
2014) (“While the procedural law of the arbitration will very often be the arbitration 
law of the arbitral seat, some national arbitration legislation [e.g., Swiss, French] 
allows parties to an arbitration seated locally to agree to a foreign procedural law, 
which will then replace or supplement most aspects of the arbitration law of the seat.”); 
PIERRE A. KARRER, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PRACTICE: 
1001 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 15 (2014) (noting that, with the exception of France, 
this is the general practice); Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, 
supra note 24, at 1319; WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS DISPUTES: STUDIES IN LAW AND PRACTICE 327 (2d ed. 2012); JEAN-
FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 84–85, 458 (Stephen V. Berti & Annette Ponti trans., 2d ed. 2007); 
WAINCYMER, supra note 19, at 1072; see also Giuditta Cordero-Moss, Is the Arbitral 
Tribunal Bound by the Parties’ Factual and Legal Pleadings?, 2006 STOCKH. INT’L 
ARB. REV. 1, 29 (2006) (“That the venue for the arbitration shall be chosen out of 
logistical or other practical reasons and without taking into consideration the legal 
framework for the proceeding, does not seem to comply with the important role that 
local arbitration law has in respect of the validity and enforceability of the award, of 
the tribunal’s power to order interim measures, or of the local court’s powers to 
intervene in or assist the arbitral procedure.”). For a critical stance on this proposition, 
see PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 635 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John 
Savage eds., 1999) (“It is widely accepted today that the seat of the arbitration, often 
chosen for reasons of convenience or because of the neutrality of the country in 
question, does not necessarily cause the procedure to be governed by the law of that 
jurisdiction. As the choice of a seat by the parties, the arbitral institution or the 
arbitrators themselves is often made on grounds entirely unrelated to the arbitral 
procedure, that choice will not automatically have an impact upon the conduct of the 
arbitral proceedings.”). For a critical review of the theories identifying the law of the 
seat as the procedural law of the arbitral proceedings, see GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, 
PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 19–46 (2003), and id. at 16–17 
(“[International arbitration] seeks to distance itself from the law of any given state, in 
that when the parties or the arbitrators choose the place of arbitration they cannot be 
presumed to have intended to be bound wholesale by any rules that state sees fit to 
impose with regard to arbitration generally.”). For a third “no-choice” view, see NIGEL 
BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 171–72 (6th ed. 2015) (“The concept that an arbitration is governed by 
the law of the place in which it is held, which is the ‘seat’ (or ‘forum’, or locus arbitri) 
of the arbitration, is well established in both the theory and practice of international 
arbitration.”), and id. at 176 (“It is also sometimes said that the parties have selected 
the procedural law that will govern their arbitration by providing for arbitration in a 
particular country. This is too elliptical . . . . What the parties have done is to choose a 
place of arbitration in a particular country. That choice brings with it submission to 
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Hence, the comparison between “foreign law as facts” and “foreign law as 
law” is irrelevant in arbitral proceedings29 because there can be only 
                                                                                                             
the laws of that country, including any mandatory provisions of its law on arbitration . . 
. . Parties may well choose a particular place of arbitration precisely because its lex arbitri 
is one that they find attractive. Nevertheless, once a place of arbitration has been chosen, 
it brings with it its own law . . . . It is not a matter of choice, any more than the notional 
motorist is free to choose which local traffic laws to obey and which to disregard.”). 
 27. LOOKOFSKY & HERTZ, supra note 25, at 834. See UNITED NATIONS COMM’N 
ON INT’L TRADE LAW, MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
art. 1(2) (2008) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].  
 28. See KARRER, supra note 26, at 161 (“[Lex] arbitri is often a genitivus 
objectivus, so one should translate as, ‘the law concerning the arbitrator.’ This is a 
law at the seat dealing with the relationship between the Arbitral Tribunal and the 
State Courts at the seat.”). Cf. Linda Silberman & Franco Ferrari, Getting to the Law 
Applicable to the Merits in International Arbitration and the Consequences of 
Getting It Wrong, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 257, 298 
(Franco Ferrari & Stefan Kröll eds., 2011) (disapproving Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws § 218, comment b, which cites two cases as examples whereby the 
selection of a particular state as situs of the arbitral tribunal “should be read as 
calling for application of that state’s local law to govern the rights of the parties 
under the contract . . .”). 
 29. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 26, at 398 (“[I]t takes only a brief 
moment of reflection to appreciate that the convenient fiction that ‘foreign law is fact’ 
does not work in the context of an international arbitration. . . . Nowadays, in almost 
all international arbitrations, ‘law’ is treated as ‘law’.”); Gillis J. Wetter, The Conduct 
of the Arbitration, 2 J. INT’L ARB. 7, 25 (1985) (“[G]eneral international arbitral 
practice does not accept the English rule that the determination of foreign law is a 
question of fact. International arbitrators do apply any law as if it were their own.”). It 
is precisely this legal or non-factual nature of the applicable law in arbitration that 
places the latter outside the ambit of the INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA Rules on the Taking of 
Evidence in International Arbitration (2010), https://www.ibanet.org/Publications 
/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx [https://perma.cc/XU42-ECTW]. 
Contra A. V. DICEY, JOHN H. C. MORRIS & LORD COLLINS, ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
1, 318 (15th ed. 2012) (“[A] finding upon foreign law made by arbitrators is a finding 
of fact which may not form the basis of an appeal on a point of law under s. 69 of the 
Arbitration Act 1996.”); FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN, supra note 26, at 692 
(“As an arbitral tribunal has no forum, it should consider all laws to be foreign laws, 
the content of which should be established as though it were an element of fact. The 
idea that foreign laws should be treated as issues of fact is well established in both 
common law and civil law systems and should apply in international arbitral 
practice.”); MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C. BOYD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 73 (2d ed. 1989) (“Since an issue as to the 
substance and effect of a foreign law is a question of fact the decision of the arbitrator 
upon it is final.” (citing Prodexport State Co. for Foreign Trade v. E.D. and F. 
Man Ltd. [1972] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 375 at 383)). 
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“applicable law.”30 By the same token, the distinction between national 
“hard” law and “soft” law instruments also is irrelevant,31 as national laws 
and “rules of law” are generally put on par under the various leges 
arbitri.32 Nonetheless, these observations do not address the issue of who 
bears the burden of establishing the content of the applicable regime. Does 
it fall on the arbitral tribunal or on the parties? Is there any such concept 
as “jura novit arbiter”33 or “jura novit tribunus”34? Is the arbitral tribunal 
empowered to resolve the dispute on unpleaded legal grounds?35 
This thorny issue should be addressed in accordance with the two-tier 
regulatory framework of arbitral proceedings.36 Specifically, it should be 
approached with reference to, firstly, the procedural agreements of the 
parties, including any arbitration rules incorporated by reference into the 
arbitration agreement, and secondly, the national law governing the 
arbitral proceedings. 
1. Party Autonomy 
It is well established that party autonomy is the cornerstone of 
international arbitration. The parties may structure their respective arbitral 
                                                                                                             
 30. ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 866 (“Unlike before 
national courts where there is a distinction between national and foreign law, in 
arbitration one can only speak of applicable law.”). 
 31. See LEW, MISTELIS & KRÖLL, supra note 24, at 441. 
 32. A typical example of a rule enshrining this proposition is UNCITRAL 
Model Law, supra note 27, art. 28(1).  
 33. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, “Iura Novit Arbiter”—Est-Ce Bien 
Raisonnable? Réflexions sur le Statut du Droit de Font devant l’Arbitre 
International, in DE LEGE FERENDA: REFLEXIONS SUR LE DROIT DESIRABLE EN 
L’HONNEUR DU PROFESSEUR ALAIN HIRSCH 71 (2004) [hereinafter Kaufmann-
Kohler, “Iura Novit Arbiter”]. 
 34. Christian P. Alberti & David M. Bigge, Ascertaining the Content of the 
Applicable Law and Iura Novit Tribunus: Approaches in Commercial and 
Investment Arbitration, 70 DISP. RESOL. J. 1 (2015). 
 35. Cf. PETROCHILOS, supra note 26, at 146 (“The relevant case law is less 
than clear-cut, no doubt because of the varying conceptions on the corresponding 
duty of a judge in national court proceedings.”). 
 36. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 26, at 156 (“[A]n arbitration 
does not exist in a legal vacuum. It is regulated, first, by the rules of procedure that 
have been agreed or adopted by the parties and the arbitral tribunal; secondly, it is 
regulated by the law of the place of arbitration. It is important to recognise . . . that 
this dualism exists.”). 
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proceedings as they see fit37—to the extent, of course, that the law 
governing the arbitral procedure allows.38 Because most—if not all—leges 
arbitri impose no limitations on the parties’ freedom to enter into special 
agreements on the content-of-laws enquiry, the parties are allowed to 
allocate the onus of establishing the content of the applicable law as they 
deem appropriate. Specifically, such an agreement may be concluded at 
any stage before or after the proceedings have been initiated but certainly 
before the closing of the hearings by the tribunal.39 It may take the form of 
                                                                                                             
 37. See BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 26, 
at 2153 (“As a practical matter, it is relatively unusual that the arbitrators will 
disagree sufficiently seriously with the parties’ agreed arbitral procedures that 
they will overrule that agreement.”); PETROCHILOS, supra note 26, at 170 (“The 
parties’ instructions to the arbitrators are always binding on them, subject of 
course to common sense and decency, professional ethics, and criminal law.”). 
 38. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards art. V(1)(d), Jun. 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New 
York Convention]; UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 27, art. 19(1); see also NIGEL 
BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 180 (5th ed. 2009) (“The procedure of an arbitration may be, and 
generally is, regulated by the rules chosen by the parties; but the procedural law is that 
of the place of arbitration and, to the extent that it contains mandatory provisions, is 
binding on the parties whether they like it or not. It may well be that the lex arbitri will 
govern with a very free rein, but it will govern nonetheless.”); Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler, Qui Contrôle l’ Arbitrage? Autonomie des Parties, Pouvoirs des Arbitres et 
Principe d’ Efficacité, in LIBER AMICORUM CLAUDE REYMOND: AUTOUR DE L’ 
ARBITRAGE 153, 161 (2004); POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 26, at 470; WAINCYMER, 
supra note 19, at 52, 109, 192. But see PETROCHILOS, supra note 26, at 170 (“[T]he 
parties may obligate the arbitrators to derogate from the law of the arbitral seat, or from 
any national law for that matter. . . . [N]either the arbitral institution nor the arbitrators 
are at liberty to [act . . .] against the parties’ agreement. At most, the arbitral institution 
may decline to administer the proceedings, and the controlling courts set the award 
aside.”). Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 5-11, Reporters’ Notes at 137–38 (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 4-15, Reporters’ Notes at 216–18 (AM. 
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012). 
 39. See Seventh Session of the Working Group on International Contract 
Practices (New York, 6-17 Feb. 1984), Report of the Working Group on the work 
of its Seventh Session (A/CN.9/246—6 March 1984), 196, [63] (“[T]he freedom 
of the parties to agree on the procedure should be a continuing one throughout the 
arbitral proceedings . . . and should not be limited . . . to the time before the first 
arbitrator was appointed.”); see also BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 26, at 
171 (“It is . . . often advisable, particularly where parties and their counsel are 
from different legal backgrounds, to agree such rules at the outset of an arbitration. 
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a clause in the arbitration or submission agreement,40 a special procedural 
agreement between the parties,41 or even an express procedural 
understanding of the parties and the tribunal, as documented in the Terms 
of Reference of the dispute.42 This practice of contractually establishing 
clear-cut procedural rules raises no serious problems in the theory and 
practice of international arbitration. The arbitrators are obliged to adhere 
to the directions of the parties.43 Should they deviate, the arbitral award 
                                                                                                             
This may be done by agreement of the parties, or by order of the arbitral tribunal 
at the first procedural meeting.”); GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER & ANTONIO 
RIGOZZI, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE IN SWITZERLAND 
376 (2015) (“In an arbitration where the actors (parties, counsel, arbitrators) come 
from different procedural traditions (ranging from legal systems where foreign 
law is a fact to be proven to systems where courts apply foreign law ex officio, 
over variations between these two extremes), arbitrators are well advised to 
address the status of the applicable law at the outset.”). 
 40. See Alberti & Bigge, supra note 34, at 1 (noting that the content of the 
applicable law issue is rarely addressed in the parties’ agreements); Ieva Kalniņa, 
Iura Novit Curia: Scylla and Charybdis of International Arbitration?, 8 BALT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 89, 92 (2008). For a model submission agreement, including a 
clause on the content-of-laws issue, see infra Part V. 
 41. See POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 26, at 459 (“In practice it will be rare 
that [the parties] develop a complete procedural code solely intended to apply to 
a particular case. Only certain sensitive questions (language, exchange of briefs, 
confidentiality or information divulged during the course of the proceedings, 
discovery, etc.) will generally be the object of a specific agreement.”). 
 42. ICC Rules of Arbitration, art. 23 (2012) (rule on the “Terms of 
Reference”); Tribunal federal [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Feb. 5, 2014, 
4A_446/2013 (Switz.) (where such an agreement was entered into with the Terms 
of Reference). For a model clause that could be included in the terms of reference, 
see infra Part V. Cf. UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Notes on 
Organizing Arbitral Proceedings (2016). 
 43. See POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 26, at 462–63 (“The majority opinion 
submits that the arbitrator or arbitrators may not veto a procedural agreement which 
has been properly concluded by the parties, but may only resign if they feel unable 
to accomplish their task. De lege lata, we feel that this majority opinion is correct 
in view of the principle of party autonomy. De lege ferenda, we are of the opinion 
that . . . the arbitrators should by law have the power to set aside agreements which 
are an obstacle to the smooth conduct of the proceedings.”); SIMON GREENBERG, 
CHRISTOPHER KEE & ROMESH J. WEERAMANTRY, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: AN ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE 307–08 (2011) (“If the arbitral 
tribunal cannot accept the parties’ agreement on a matter of procedure, it should 
ordinarily offer its resignation. However, in practice an experienced arbitral tribunal 
may effectively require the parties to abide by certain procedural rules and decisions 
despite a reluctance by both parties.”); THOMAS H. WEBSTER, HANDBOOK OF 
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION; COMMENTARY, PRECEDENTS AND MATERIALS FOR 
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most likely will be set aside44 or pronounced unenforceable45 by the courts 
at the tribunal’s seat or in any other country where enforcement is sought. 
Most frequently, however, procedural agreements between the parties take 
the form of a clause incorporating by reference institutional or other model 
arbitration rules into the arbitration agreement.46 That said, most institutional 
and other model arbitration rules are silent on the content-of-laws enquiry.47 
                                                                                                             
UNCITRAL BASED ARBITRATION RULES 269–70 (2010) (“If the members of the 
Tribunal disagree with the procedure adopted by the parties, . . . they can and should 
express their preferences. If the parties persist on an important issue of procedure, 
then the members of the Tribunal may well have the right to resign.”). 
 44. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 27, art. 34(1), (2)(a)(iv).  
 45. See New York Convention, supra note 38, art. (V)(1)(d); UNCITRAL 
Model Law, supra note 27, art. 36(1)(a)(iv). 
 46. See U.N. Secretary-General, Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, at 44, U.N. Doc. A.CN.9/264 
(March 25, 1985) [hereinafter Analytical Commentary]; see also GARY B. BORN, 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 778 (2d ed. 2015) 
(“Although national law in most developed states will permit the parties to agree upon 
the arbitral procedures . . . parties often do not agree in advance on detailed procedural 
rules. At most, international commercial arbitration agreements will provide for 
arbitration pursuant to a set of institutional rules, which will ordinarily supply only a 
broad procedural framework.”). Cf. AM. LAW INST. & UNIDROIT, ALI/UNIDROIT 
Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, Principle 22(1) (2006) (“The court is 
responsible for considering all relevant facts and evidence and for determining the 
correct legal basis for its decisions, including matters determined on the basis of 
foreign law.”) (emphasis added), and id. Principle 22(2)(3) (“The court may, while 
affording the parties opportunity to respond: Rely upon a legal theory or an 
interpretation of the facts or of the evidence that has not been advanced by a party.”) 
(emphasis added). It is only logical that such soft-law instruments, which were 
promulgated with an eye on international civil litigation, be only mutatis mutandis 
applicable to international arbitration. 
 47. Alberti, supra note 24, at 16–17 (“One reason for the silence on [how the 
applicable law and its content should be ascertained] may be that institutions need 
to keep their rules flexible enough to allow parties from all jurisdictions to ‘feel 
comfortable’ with their rules without cutting too far into procedural maxims.”); 
Knuts, supra note 24, at 672; LEW, MISTELIS & KRÖLL, supra note 24, at 443; see 
also CROFT, KEE & WAINCYMER, supra note 24, at 402 (“This [lack of special 
rules in the UNCITRAL Model Rules] is largely because different legal families 
have taken fundamentally different approaches to this question.”); Teresa 
Giovannini, Ex Officio Powers to Investigate: When Do Arbitrators Cross the 
Line?, in STORIES FROM THE HEARING ROOM: EXPERIENCE FROM ARBITRAL 
PRACTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MICHAEL E. SCHNEIDER 59, 66 & n.38 (Bernd 
Ehle & Domitille Bazieau eds., 2014) (noting, as exceptions to this general 
observation, the LCIA Arbitration Rules of 1998, art. 22(1)(c) [LCIA Arbitration 
Rules of 2014, art. 22(1)(iii)], CIETAC Arbitration Rules, arts. 29(3) and 27 [sic] 
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2. Lex Arbitri 
In the absence of a special procedural agreement between the parties, 
the arbitral tribunal will have to adhere to the mandates of the lex arbitri. 
Most national laws on international arbitration, however, lack any rules—
let alone any mandatory rules—on the ascertainment of the content of the 
governing law.48 Instead, they usually provide for a procedural catch-all 
rule that empowers the tribunal to conduct the arbitration in an 
“appropriate manner,”49 “unimpeded by local peculiarities and traditional 
                                                                                                             
[arts. 35(1) and 35(3) being more relevant to the issue], and SIAC Rules of 2013, 
art. 24(1)(d) [SIAC Rules of 2016, art. 27(c)]. For other notable examples, see 
JAMS, JAMS International Arbitration Rules and Procedures, art. 21(4) (2016); 
Polish Chamber of Commerce, PCC Arbitration Rules, § 6(2) (2015); Kuala 
Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration, KLRCA Fast Track Rules, § 13(9) 
(2010); Belarusian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, BCCI Arbitration Rules, 
art. 38(2) (2008); CPR Rules for Expedited Arbitration of Construction Disputes, 
R. 12(6) (2006). For arbitration rules that are nearly identical with the LCIA 
Arbitration Rules, art. 22(1)(iii) (2014), see Dubai International Financial Centre, 
Arbitration Centre, DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 22(1)(iii) (2016); LCIA 
India Arbitration Rules, art. 22(1)(b) (2010); Bangladesh Council for Arbitration 
of the Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry, BCA 
Arbitration Rules, art. 14(3)(1)(b) (2004). It is surprising that no negotiations on 
the content-of-laws issue can be traced in the preparatory works of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules—in either the 1976 or the 2010 versions. 
 48. Teresa Giovannini, International Arbitration and Jura Novit Curia—
Towards Harmonization, 9 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 5 (2012); Isele, supra 
note 24, at 14, 17; Kalniņa, supra note 40, at 92; Knuts, supra note 24, at 672; 
WAINCYMER, supra note 19, at 1068; see also ILA Report & Recommendations, 
supra note 17, at 867–68 (noting three exceptions to this general proposition, 
namely the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, art. 1044, the Danish Arbitration Act, 
§ 27(2) (2005), and the English Arbitration Act 1996, §§ 34(1), (2)(g) (Eng.) 
[hereinafter English Arbitration Act]. For other national law provisions that are 
nearly identical with § 34(2)(g) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996, see 
Arbitration Act 2013, § 54(7) (Virgin Is.); Arbitration Ordinance, 2013 Cap. 609, 
§ 56(7) (H.K.); International Arbitration Act 2008, § 24(3)(g) (Mauritius); 
International Arbitration Act 2002, § 12(3) (Sing.); Arbitration Act 2001, § 
25(3)(g) (Bangl.). For other national law provisions on the content-of-laws 
enquiry, see Law on the International Arbitral Court 1999 (as amended in 2014), 
art. 37 (Belr.); Arbitration Act 2009, art. 45(2)(g) (Bah.); Arbitration Act 2004, 
art. 32 (Nor.). As with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, it is quite surprising 
that the content-of-laws issue was not discussed during the drafting of either the 
1985 or the 2006 versions of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
 49. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 27, art. 19(2); Analytical 
Commentary, supra note 46, at 45 (“This enables the arbitral tribunal to meet the 
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standards[,] which may be found in the existing domestic law of the place 
[of arbitration]”50—albeit always within the mandatory rules of the lex 
arbitri and the fundamental principles of arbitration.51 Although this latter 
                                                                                                             
needs of the particular case and to select the most suitable procedure when 
organizing the arbitration, conducting individual hearings or other meetings and 
determining the important specifics of taking and evaluating evidence.”); see also 
BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 46, at 778 (“This authority [of 
the arbitrators] has enormous practical importance because it is rare case where 
the parties to an arbitration will find common ground on all of the procedural 
issues that confront them.”); POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 26, at 463 (“The 
power of the arbitrators to determine the arbitral procedure is more restricted than 
that of the parties.”). Cf. EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 98 (2010) (noting that the practice has evolved in 
that the arbitrators “address concrete procedural issues as and when they arise 
during the course of the arbitration,” rather than by selecting a particular legal 
regime at the outset of the proceedings); PARK, supra note 26, at 159 (“[T]he 
tendency (or perhaps temptation) for arbitrators and litigants alike is often to wait 
to address a procedural question until it arises, for the simple reason that it may 
not arise at all.”); id. at 172 (“The best moment for establishment of procedural 
protocols lies before proceedings begin, in an initial procedural order. In practice, 
however, many arbitrators (and litigants) may shy away from raising matters that 
could cause unnecessary wrangling at the beginning of the proceedings . . . .”). 
 50. Analytical Commentary, supra note 46, at 44, 46 (“In practical terms, the 
arbitrators would be able to adopt the procedural features familiar, or at least 
acceptable, to the parties (and to them). . . . Above all, where the parties are from 
different legal systems, the arbitral tribunal may use a liberal ‘mixed’ procedure, 
adopting suitable features from different legal systems and relying on techniques 
proven in international practice . . . . Such procedural discretion . . . seems 
conducive to facilitating international commercial arbitration, while being forced 
to apply the ‘law of the land’ where the arbitration happens to take place would 
present a major disadvantage to any party not used to that particular and possibly 
peculiar system of procedure and evidence.”). 
 51. HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 583 (1989) (referring to the Analytical 
Commentary on the Draft Model Law, “[w]here the parties have not agreed, 
before or during the arbitral proceedings, on the procedure (i.e. at least not on the 
particular matter at issue), the arbitral tribunal is empowered to conduct the 
arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, subject only to the 
provisions of the model law which often set forth special features of the 
discretionary powers (e.g., articles 23(2), 24(1), (2) [Art. 24(1) in the final text], 
25) and sometimes limit the discretion to ensure fairness (e.g. articles 19(3) [Art. 
18 in the final text], 24(3), (4) [Art. 24(2), (3) in the final text], 26(2)).”); Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-Kohler, Identifying and Applying the Law Governing the Arbitration 
Procedure—The Role of the Law of the Place of Arbitration, in IMPROVING THE 
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rule delineates, in very broad terms, what the arbitrators can do, it gives 
no guidance as to what the arbitrators should do with respect to 
establishing the content of the applicable law. It is precisely this regulatory 
vacuum that allowed for the articulation of various legal theories 
augmenting legal uncertainty on the topic. These theories and approaches 
are examined in detail in the following paragraphs. 
B. The “Fall-Back” Approach 
In an attempt to fill the aforementioned legal gap, it has been argued 
that, absent an agreement of the parties, the arbitrators should fall back on 
the rules of civil procedure in force at the tribunal’s seat.52 This may be 
described as the fall-back [on civil procedure] approach. Hence, if the 
                                                                                                             
EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF 
APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 336, 357 (Albert Jan Van den Berg 
ed., 1999) (“In the event that the parties have made no use of their freedom, the 
arbitrators have broad discretionary powers. Unlike the parties, however, they 
must apply the non-mandatory or supplementary rules of the Model Law, which 
are all meant to implement the overriding due process principle.”). 
 52. Schütze, supra note 24, at 722 (“The ascertainment of the content and the 
application of foreign law in arbitral proceedings follows the same rules that are 
applicable in litigation before national courts.”) (author’s translation from the 
original). Contra JOSHUA KARTON, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF CONTRACT LAW 154 (2013) (“[I]t is 
generally agreed that domestic rules on the ascertainment of the governing law 
should not be applied by analogy to ICA.”); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, The 
Arbitrator and the Law: Does He/She Know It? Apply It? How? And a Few More 
Questions, 21 ARB. INT’L 631, 633 (2005) (“Many arbitration practitioners 
approach the status of the law governing the merits by reference to the rules 
applicable in their home courts. With due respect, such an approach makes little 
sense.”). But see BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 46, at 777, 786 
(“Historically, it was frequently said or assumed that arbitrators were required to 
apply the domestic procedural rules applicable in national courts in the arbitral 
seat . . . [on the contrary,] . . . it is well-settled in virtually all developed 
jurisdictions that arbitrators are not required to apply local civil procedure rules 
applicable in national court litigation, in an international arbitration.”); 
GAILLARD, supra note 49, at 93 (highlighting a trend toward acknowledging the 
freedom of the arbitrators “to depart from the rules applicable by the courts of the 
country of the seat . . .”); POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 26, at 463 (“The former 
doctrine pursuant to which the law of civil procedure (and not just the law 
governing the arbitration) in force at the place of the seat of the arbitration was 
binding on the arbitrators in the absence of procedural agreements of the parties 
is no longer followed in [Belgium, England, France, Germany, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland].”). 
2018] REVISITING THE “CONTENT-OF-LAWS” ENQUIRY 831 
 
 
 
tribunal maintains its situs in a jurisdiction where the courts are required 
to establish the content of the applicable foreign law ex officio, the 
arbitrators, too, would be required to establish the content of the applicable 
law on their own motion. By the same token, should the tribunal be located 
in a jurisdiction where foreign law is established exclusively by the 
litigating parties, it would be the duty of the parties to educate the arbitral 
tribunal accordingly.53 
This approach, however, fails to take into account the fundamental 
differences between international litigation and arbitration.54 The rules of 
civil procedure have been promulgated exclusively for the regulation of 
litigation proceedings, reflecting features and objectives of the forum 
state.55 In addition, unique provisions of national procedural regimes, such 
                                                                                                             
 53. See MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 29, at 19, 72–73 (implying that this 
practice was followed in England before the entry into force of the Arbitration 
Act of 1996); see also Parties not indicated, Final Award, ICC Case No. 
8677/FMS (1997), 1 INT’L J. ARAB ARB. 333, 354–55 (2009) (seat of the tribunal 
in London, England) (“Neither expert on the law of D country offered any opinion 
on what the expression ‘in transit’ might be constructed as meaning under that 
law. I am entitled to look at the authorities (which are English) cited by the 
Defendant on this question: the place of the arbitration is London and it is a rule 
of English procedural law that, absent evidence, a foreign law should be assumed 
to be the same as the domestic law.”); Hussmann (Europe) Ltd. v. Al Ameen Dev. 
& Trade Co. & Ors. [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 83, [42] (Eng.) (quoting MUSTILL & 
BOYD, supra note 29) (“If there is no suggestion by the parties that there is an 
issue under the applicable system of law which is different from the law of 
England and Wales, or the tribunal does not itself raise a specific issue, then the 
tribunal is free to decide the matter on the basis of the presumption that the 
applicable system of law is the same as the law of England and Wales.”). 
 54. See ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 881, 
Recommendation No. 4. Cf. Kalniņa, supra note 40, at 92 (“[N]ational judges . . . 
are under an inherent duty to provide justice[, whereas] . . . international arbitrators 
. . . are often perceived as mere ‘service providers’ for settling disputes of an 
essentially commercial nature.”). 
 55. ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 866; LEW, MISTELIS 
& KRÖLL, supra note 24, at 523 (“Although the arbitration tribunal performs a 
judicial function, rules of national civil procedure are invariably unsuitable and 
irrelevant for international arbitration.”). For agreements identifying national 
procedural law as the regulatory framework of the arbitral proceedings, see id. at 
524 (“Unless the chosen law contains specific provisions for international 
arbitration such a choice is unwise as national civil procedure rules are normally 
designed for domestic litigation before state courts, not for the arbitration of 
international cases. Arbitration requires a greater degree of flexibility.”); POUDRET 
& BESSON, supra note 26, at 460 (“[T]he application of such [civil procedure] law 
risks raising serious difficulties due to the fact that it is integrated in the judicial 
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as the English “default rule” that mandates the application of English law 
when foreign law has been neither pleaded nor proven by the litigating 
parties, do not fit into international arbitration, which, as already 
suggested, has no lex fori.56 Furthermore, arbitral tribunals do not have the 
special mechanisms available to national courts, such as foreign law 
institutions, governmental, or other services responsible for the 
establishment of foreign laws.57 Equally important, this fall-back approach 
does not reckon with the possibility that arbitrators could be selected for 
their commercial awareness and expertise in a field other than law.58 
Granted, even if the appointed arbitrators have received legal training, they 
                                                                                                             
organisation of a country and is not adapted to arbitration.”); WAINCYMER, supra 
note 19, at 192 (“The [selected civil procedure] rules may be inadequate from a 
policy perspective and there may be complex interpretational questions as to which 
parts of the rules apply when some elements might seem only applicable to court 
procedures. Such an approach would never seem desirable.”). 
 56. ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 881, Recommendation 
No. 4; BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 26, at 2734 
(“These presumptions are inapplicable in international arbitration because the 
tribunal has no local substantive law to turn to . . . .”); id. at 2293–94 (arguing that 
the “default rule” approach is inconsistent with modern international arbitration 
theory and the application of the jura novit curia principle in international 
arbitration); Doug Jones, The Remedial Armoury of an Arbitral Tribunal: The 
Extent to Which Tribunals Can Look Beyond the Parties’ Submissions, 78 ARB. 102, 
113 (2012) (“A tribunal in international arbitration has no ‘forum’ law upon which 
it can fall back if the content of the substantive law cannot be ascertained 
satisfactorily.”); PETROCHILOS, supra note 26, at 175 (“[I]t is inappropriate without 
more to adopt a procedural rule reflecting a particularity of municipal law, such as 
the English law rule that if the content of the foreign law pleaded is not proved as a 
fact the arbitrator is ‘compelled’ to presume that the law of the seat is the same as 
that foreign law.”); see also Isele, supra note 24, at 21; Kalniņa, supra note 40, at 
91–92. But see Cordero-Moss, supra note 26, at 22 (“If the evidence is still not 
satisfactory, the tribunal will apply the presumption that foreign law is the same as 
English law; and English law is applied ex officio by the tribunal.”). For a dismissal 
of Professor Cordero-Moss’s position, see Harris Bor, Expert Evidence, in 
ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND: WITH CHAPTERS ON SCOTLAND AND IRELAND 503, 524 
(Julian D.M. Lew et al. eds., 2013) (noting, in the context of Hussmann [Europe] 
Ltd v. Al Ameen Development & Trade Co & Ors [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 83, that 
“[t]here is . . . an apparent anomaly in that the English court has also recognised the 
right of a tribunal with its seat in England to presume that, where parties do not raise 
an issue about the applicability of a foreign law rule, the law of England and Wales 
should apply.”). 
 57. See, e.g., art. 1044 Rv (Neth.); English Arbitration Act, supra note 48, §§ 
35, 8291. 
 58. See Alberti, supra note 24, at 28; Isele, supra note 24, at 21. 
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would only exceptionally be familiar with the substantive law governing 
the merits of the dispute.59 Last but not least, “being forced to apply the 
[procedural] ‘law of the land’ where the arbitration happens to take place 
would present a major disadvantage to any party not used to that particular 
and possibly peculiar system of procedure and evidence.”60 On account of 
the foregoing analysis, the fall-back approach should be rejected. 
At this point, one cannot fail to observe that the fall-back approach 
does not address the content-of-laws enquiry de lege ferenda but offers 
only an easy way around the problem by referring the arbitrators to the 
rules of international litigation at the tribunal’s seat. Accordingly, the 
following paragraphs jettison this “reflexive” reference61 and focus instead 
on the “core” of the content-of-laws enquiry, that is, whether the arbitral 
tribunal should adopt an inquisitorial, adversarial, or, as argued herein, 
hybrid approach to the ascertainment of the content of the governing law 
in international arbitration. 
C. The Inquisitorial Approach 
An inquisitorial procedure translates into the application of the jura 
novit arbiter principle. It would be the tribunal’s duty to ascertain the 
content of the applicable law and to resolve the dispute on the “correct” 
legal grounds,62 even if the relevant arguments have not been advanced or 
the pertinent legal issues have not been raised by either of the parties. 
The high costs and tardiness associated with establishing the content 
of the applicable law by the arbitrators have been identified as major 
                                                                                                             
 59. Giovannini, supra note 47, at 64; Isele, supra note 24, at 21; Kalniņa, supra 
note 40, at 92; LEW, MISTELIS & KRÖLL, supra note 24, at 440 (“Arbitrators may have 
little or no connection with or access to the applicable national law, unlike the national 
judges who normally apply the law they have been trained in for years.”). But see 
Bernard Hanotiau, The Conduct of the Hearings, in THE LEADING ARBITRATORS’ 
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 633, 650 (Lawrence W. Newman & 
Richard D. Hill eds., 3d ed. 2014) (“In international arbitration, the arbitral tribunal 
will often include at least one member familiar with the ‘foreign’ applicable law.”). 
 60. Analytical Commentary, supra note 46, at 46. 
 61. Cf. ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 866 (“[A]ny 
automatic transposition of national rules to arbitration would raise a conflict issue 
(i.e., whether arbitrators should apply the national rules of the law of the seat, of the 
law governing the merits or some other law).”). 
 62. “Correct” as defined by the parties. Cf. SAVIGNY, supra note 10, at 70 
(providing the quintessential question in the Savignian conflict-of-laws theory, 
that is, “[t]o ascertain for every legal relation (case) that law to which, in its proper 
nature, it belongs or is subject.”). 
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disadvantages of the inquisitorial approach.63 Besides, the appointed 
arbitrators may not have received legal training altogether. Still, even if 
the arbitrators have received legal training, resolving the dispute on 
unpleaded grounds without allowing further submissions by the parties 
could be indicia of a biased tribunal.64 A proactive tribunal, however, 
safeguards the “correct” legal outcome of the dispute,65 especially 
considering that the parties—or, more accurately, the representatives of 
the parties—could present a distorted picture of the law to their benefit.66 
                                                                                                             
 63. Alberti, supra note 24, at 27–28; Isele, supra note 24, at 21 (“[The 
increase in costs] is, of course, not necessarily so in every arbitration, but an 
affirmative duty [to ascertain the content of the applicable law] would certainly 
lead to a danger of such increase.”); Jones, supra note 56, at 113 (“[W]henever 
the tribunal is under a heavier duty to research and ascertain the content of 
unfamiliar substantive law, the costs of arbitration may increase.”); see also LEW, 
MISTELIS & KRÖLL, supra note 24, at 443 (“Considerations of expense may . . . 
deter parties from wanting tribunals to undertake such research.”). 
 64. Alberti, supra note 24, at 6, 28; Cordero-Moss, supra note 26, at 7; 
Antonias Dimolitsa, The Equivocal Power of the Arbitrators to Introduce Ex 
Officio New Issues of Law, 27 ASA BULL. 426, 438 (2009); Kalniņa, supra note 
40, at 91; Knuts, supra note 24, at 674. Cf. PT Prima Int’l Dev. v. Kempinski 
Hotels, [2012] SGCA 35, [59] (Sing.) (“Given that the Arbitrator is a Professor of 
Law of the National University of Singapore, it is not surprising that he thought 
of all the possible legal ramifications that could arise from the facts before him 
and then sought the views of counsel for the parties on those matters. In our view, 
the Arbitrator’s inquiries would not have given rise to a reasonable suspicion or 
apprehension on the part of a fair-minded reasonable person with knowledge of 
the relevant facts that he (the Arbitrator) was biased or had already made up his 
mind when he raised the matters.”). 
 65. See Cordero-Moss, supra note 26, at 7 (“[I]t seems legitimate to affirm that 
the tribunal, by acting ex officio[,] . . . acts in order to achieve a logical and objective 
result.”). 
 66. Alberti, supra note 24, at 27; Giovannini, supra note 48, at 6 (“Lawyers 
are obviously zealous in submitting only those court decisions or legal doctrine 
excerpts that serve the purpose of their case . . . . It is the tribunal’s duty to verify 
these sources independently.”). Cf. INT’L BAR ASS’N COUNCIL, IBA Guidelines 
on Party Representation in International Arbitration, Guideline No. 9 (2013) (“A 
Party Representative should not make any knowingly false submission of fact to 
the Arbitral Tribunal.”) (emphasis added); IBA Arbitration Committee Comments 
to Guidelines 9–11 (“With respect to legal submissions to the Tribunal, a Party 
Representative may argue any construction of a law, a contract, a treaty or any 
authority that he or she believes is reasonable.”) (emphasis added). For the 
usefulness of the inquisitorial approach in the event of a defaulting respondent 
party, see ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 882, 
Recommendation No. 14; Dimolitsa, supra note 64, at 429; Giovannini, supra 
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This proactive approach is all the more important given the lack of 
appellate review of arbitral awards,67 the lack of grounds for the annulment 
of an arbitral award, or the refusal of its enforcement for erroneous 
application of the governing law.68 
                                                                                                             
note 47, at 64; PETROCHILOS, supra note 26, at 149. But see Ting Kang Chung 
John v. Teo Hee Lai Bldng. Constructions, [2010] SGHC 20, [49] (Sing.) (“It is 
certainly not the duty of an arbitrator in a default hearing to assume the role of 
advocate for the absent party or to protect its interests . . . . All the arbitrator is 
required to do in such circumstances is to scrutinise the evidence of the attending 
party, ask such questions as he feels necessary on their evidence to satisfy himself 
that it proves their case and claims on a balance of probabilities. He is entitled to 
test and probe internal inconsistencies or contradictions appearing on the 
attending party’s evidence. He is not to act as an advocate for the absent party 
based on that absent party’s pleadings and/or documents and/or AEICs if they 
have been filed.”); Philip Fisher v. P.G. Wellfair Ltd. (in liq), [1981] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 514, 522 (Eng.) (“I am afraid that the arbitrator fell into error here. He felt 
that it was his duty to protect the interests of the unrepresented party—in much 
the same way as a judge protects a litigant in person. But in a case like this I do 
not think it is the duty of the arbitrator to protect the interests of the unrepresented 
party. If the defendants do not choose to turn up to protect themselves, it is no part 
of the arbitrator’s duty to do it for them. In particular he must not throw his own 
evidence into the scale on behalf of the unrepresented party—or use his own 
special knowledge for the benefit of the unrepresented party—at any rate he must 
not do so without giving the plaintiffs’ experts a chance of dealing with it—for 
they may be able to persuade him that his own view is erroneous.”). 
 67. See Park, supra note 2, at 42; see also ANDREWS, supra note 24, at 365 
n.317 (noting that, in light of §§ 82(1) and 69 of the English Arbitration Act refers 
only to errors of English law, but not to errors of “foreign,” that is, non-English, 
law); BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 26, at 595–96 (referring to the two 
extremes of the “spectrum,” that is, article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and § 
69 of the English Arbitration Act of 1996, precluding and allowing an appeal for 
mistakes of law by the arbitral tribunal respectively); PARK, supra note 26 at 139, 
331–32, and particularly 166 (“[A]n agreement to arbitrate usually incorporates a 
waiver of the right to challenge findings of law or fact.”). Cf. English Arbitration 
Act, supra note 48, §§ 69, 82(1); London Underground Ltd. v. Citylink Telecomm. 
Ltd., [2007] EWHC (TCC) 1749, [59] (Eng.) (“[T]he fact finding stage and the stage 
of the [sic] applying the law to the facts are separate from the stage of ascertaining 
the law. It is only the stage where the arbitrator ascertains the law and, by inference 
from the application of the law, properly understands the law that may be the proper 
subject of a question of law under section 69.”). 
 68. ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 872; Cordero-Moss, 
supra note 26, at 12; Anna P. Mantakou, The Misadventures of the Principle Jura 
Novit Curia in International Arbitration—A Practitioner’s Approach, in IN 
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SPYRIDON VL. VRELLIS 487, 492 
(2014); see also PETROCHILOS, supra note 26, at 148 (“Although an award may 
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The inquisitorial approach has been adopted in numerous arbitral 
proceedings,69 and various degradations of it have been followed by the 
                                                                                                             
not in principle be set aside for . . . errors in the law . . . , if a tribunal should reach 
‘grossly unfair or arbitrary conclusions’ this should be taken as an indication that 
it either was patently biased or breached its duty to hear the parties in equality.”). 
But see the notorious ground for annulment of arbitral awards for “manifest 
disregard of the law” examined infra Part IV.B.4. In the context of ICSID 
arbitration, see generally INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
(“ICSID”), Updated Background Paper on Annulment for the Administrative 
Council of ICSID (May 2016), icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources 
/Background%20Paper%20on%20Annulment%20April%202016%20ENG.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/UR3P-CPXB]; CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID 
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 959–65 (2d ed. 2009). 
 69. Distributor (EU country) v. Manufacturer (EU country), Final Award, 
SCC Case No. 158/2011 (2013), 38 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 253, 263 (seat of the 
tribunal in Stockholm, Sweden) (“The Sole Arbitrator notes that the principle iura 
novit curia (the court knows the law) applies also in international arbitration, 
with the consequence that the content of the law does not have to be proven by 
the parties and that international arbitrators are permitted to rely on their own 
knowledge of the law, provided that the parties are given the opportunity to be 
heard and are not taken by surprise.”) (emphasis added); Seller (Turkey) v. Buyer 
(Turkey), Final Award, ICC Case No. 16168 (2013), 38 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 205, 
214 (seat of the tribunal in Hamburg, Germany) (“The Arbitral Tribunal notes, 
however, that Respondent was not able to present and—to the best of the 
knowledge of the Arbitral Tribunal—there does not seem to exist any case law or 
legal authority that affirmatively states.”) (emphasis added); X (nationality not 
indicated) v. Y (nationality not indicated) and Y2 (nationality not indicated), 
Award, ICC Case No. 12073 (2003), 33 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 63, 69–71 (seat of the 
tribunal in Geneva, Switzerland) (embarking also on a brief comparative law 
review of the legal issue under examination); Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) 
v. M. & Federazione Ciclistica Italiana (FCI), Award, CAS Case No. 1998/A/212 
(1999), Digest of CAS Awards, Vol. II (1998-2000), Matthieu Reeb ed., Kluwer 
Law International (2002), 274, 277 (seat of the tribunal in Lausanne, Switzerland) 
(“The Panel established the content of the applicable foreign law in co-operation 
with the parties. . . . Moreover, the Panel undertook further research on its own 
motion.”) (emphasis added); Sponsor (Qatar) v. Contractor (Italy), Final Award, 
ICC Case No. 7639 (1994), IV, in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 214, 
223 (Jean-Jacques Arnaldez, Yves Derains & Dominique Hascher eds., 2003) 
(seat of the tribunal in Paris, France) (“[T]he Tribunal has decided to consider 
these principles as part of its Terms of Reference, in its genuine and serious desire 
to be fair to both parties, by, among other things, considering the general 
principles of equity, although this aspect has been disregarded by both parties all 
through the proceedings.”) (emphasis added); European Consortium of 4 Cos. v. 
Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources of an African State, Phase I: 
Partial Award in Jurisdiction, CRCICA Case No. 39/93 (1994), IV, in ARBITRAL 
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judiciary of many countries, such as Sweden,70 Switzerland,71 Belgium,72 
Finland,73 Germany,74 the Netherlands,75 and Spain.76 
D. The Adversarial Approach 
In stark contrast to the inquisitorial approach, adopting an adversarial 
method of establishing the content of the applicable law amplifies one of 
the principal underpinnings of arbitration—party initiative. It rests entirely 
with the parties to inform—and, thus, limit—the tribunal vis-à-vis the 
legal basis of the dispute. The tribunal will act as an umpire, selecting 
                                                                                                             
AWARDS OF THE CAIRO REGIONAL CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 299, 304 (M.E.I. Alam Eldin ed., 2014) (seat of the tribunal in 
Cairo, Egypt) (“The Tribunal does not consider itself as exclusively limited by the 
legal arguments and defences of the parties. Pursuant to the principle ‘iura novit 
curia,’ the Tribunal has conducted its own further investigations in Egyptian law 
in order to reach a correct conclusion on the delicate issue of its jurisdiction.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 70. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 71. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 72. Hans Van Houtte, Belgium, in PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 179, 214 (Frank-Bernd Weigand 
ed., 2d ed. 2009); Caroline Verbruggen, Commentary on Part IV of the Belgian 
Judicial Code, Chapter VII: Article 1717, in ARBITRATION IN BELGIUM 455, 470–
71 (Niuscha Bassiri & Maarten Draye eds., 2016) (noting that Belgium follows 
the inquisitorial approach together with the “no-surprise” rule). 
 73. Finland follows the inquisitorial approach together with the “no-surprise” 
rule. See Werfen Austria GmbH v. Polar Electro Europe B.V., Korkein oikeus 
[KKO] [Supreme Court] 2008:77 (Fin.), http://www.finlex.fi/fi/oikeus/kko/kko 
/2008/20080077#aOT20080077_3 [https://perma.cc/DD47-86KF]. 
 74. Stefan Kröll, § 1061—Foreign Awards, in ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: 
THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE 443, 472–73 (K. Böckstiegel, Stefan Kröll & Patricia 
Nacimiento eds., 2d ed. 2015). 
 75. Vesna Lazić & Gerard J. Meijer, Netherlands, in PRACTITIONER’S 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 72, at 
617, 670 (referring, also, to article 1044 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, 
which empowers the arbitral tribunal to request, through the President of the 
District Court of The Hague, information on the content of the applicable law, 
using the mechanism of the 1968 London Convention). 
 76. Spanish courts have consistently affirmed the application of the jura novit 
curia principle in arbitral proceedings. See, e.g., S.T.S., Feb. 11, 2010 (R.O.J. No. 
1669/2010); S.A.P. Madrid, Feb. 12, 2010 (R.O.J. No. 2049/2010); S.A.P. Madrid, 
Oct. 27, 2008 (R.O.J. No. 14661/2008); S.T.S.J. Cataluña, Jul. 17, 2014 (R.O.J. No. 
7775/2014); S.T.S.J. Cataluña, Nov. 25, 2013 (R.O.J. No. 11562/2013); S.T.S.J. 
Madrid, Oct. 15, 2013 (R.O.J. No. 15971/2013). 
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amongst the arguments of the parties.77 Hence, under such an adversarial 
system, “the impartiality of the judge [“arbitrator” in the context of this 
study] in the eyes of the parties’ is preserved.”78 This pursuit of 
“preserving” the impartiality of the adjudicators, however, could be in 
tension with the desideratum of resolving the dispute on “correct” legal 
grounds.79 This last remark raises the question of what the arbitrators 
should do in the event of the parties’ failure to educate the arbitral tribunal 
with respect to the content of the governing law. Bearing in mind that this 
scenario has been overlooked in academic discourse,80 it is not surprising 
that legal practice has yielded non-uniform results, with some arbitral 
tribunals applying the substantive law of the tribunal’s seat81 and others 
                                                                                                             
 77. See Cordero-Moss, supra note 26, at 14; cf. The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice 
Staughton, Common Law and Civil Law Procedures: Which is the More 
Inquisitorial? A Common Lawyer’s Response, 5 ARB. INT’L 351, 352 (1989). 
 78. Staughton, supra note 77, at 353.  
 79. Id. 
 80. This neglect is not unjustifiable, considering that making legal 
submissions is the norm in arbitral proceedings. 
 81. Parties not indicated, Final Award, ICC Case No. 8677/FMS (1997), 1 
INT’L J. ARAB ARB. 333, 354–55 (2009) (seat of the tribunal in London, England) 
(“Neither expert on the law of D country offered any opinion on what the 
expression ‘in transit’ might be constructed as meaning under that law. I am 
entitled to look at the authorities (which are English) cited by the Defendant on 
this question: the place of the arbitration is London and it is a rule of English 
procedural law that, absent evidence, a foreign law should be assumed to be the 
same as the domestic law.”); Franchisor (Austrian) v. Frachisee (South African), 
Final Award, ICC Case No. 5460 (1987), II, in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL 
AWARDS 136, 138 (Sigvard Jardin, Yves Derains & Jean-Jacques Arnaldez eds., 
1994) (seat of the tribunal in London, England) (“The place of this arbitration is 
London, and on any question of choice of law I must therefore apply the relevant 
rules of the private international law of England. . . . Under the rules of English 
private international law, foreign law is a question of fact, to be established by 
expert evidence; failing evidence to the contrary, English private international law 
compels me to assume that any foreign law is the same with any evidence about 
the South African substantive law of contract. Accordingly, I am bound to assume 
that it does not differ from the law of England.”); see also the well-known 
Hussmann (Europe) Ltd. v. Al Ameen Dev. & Trade Co & Ors. [2000] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 83, [42] (“If there is no suggestion by the parties that there is an issue under 
the applicable system of law which is different from the law of England and 
Wales, or the tribunal does not itself raise a specific issue, then the tribunal is free 
to decide the matter on the basis of the presumption that the applicable system of 
law is the same as the law of England and Wales.”). 
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rejecting the argument advanced,82 or even the entirety of the claim 
made,83 on unproven legal grounds. 
E. The “Hybrid” Approach 
Building on the premises of the inquisitorial and adversarial 
approaches already described,84 it has been maintained in legal theory that 
a so-called hybrid method should be preferred for the determination of 
what the applicable law provides for.85 Drawing upon the core elements of 
the aforementioned approaches, the hybrid method sets the legal 
arguments of the parties as the point of departure for any content-of-laws 
determination.86 At the same time, it provides the arbitrators with 
significant latitude regarding the legal analysis of the dispute.87 The major 
drawback of this approach, however, is the lack of clarity as to what it 
entails. Other than its two fundamental pillars—party initiative and 
flexibility of the arbitral tribunal—academic discourse has yet to guide 
legal practice through a series of important content-of-laws issues, such as 
the ascertainment and application of overriding mandatory rules, the use 
of corroborating sources and arguments by the arbitrators, and the different 
legal classification of the dispute, among others.88 
IV. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE CONTENT-OF-LAWS ENQUIRY 
IN PRACTICE 
Following this theoretical overview of the content-of-laws enquiry in 
international arbitration,89 Part IV focuses on the actual legal practice in 
                                                                                                             
 82. Consultant (State Y) v. State agency (State Z), State owned bank (State Z), 
Final Award, ICC Case No. 7047 (1994), IV, in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL 
AWARDS 32, 37, 41 (Jean-Jacques Arnaldez, Yves Derains & Dominique Hascher 
eds., 2003) (seat of the tribunal in Geneva, Switzerland). 
 83. Agent (US) v. Principal (Russian Federation), Final Award ICC Case No. 
13756 (2008), 39 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 118, 136 (seat of the tribunal in Stockholm, 
Sweden). 
 84. See supra Part III.C.–D. 
 85. Nigel Blackaby & Ricardo Chirinos, Consideraciones Sobre la 
Aplicación del Principio Iura Novit Curia en el Arbitraje Comercial 
Internacional, 6 ANU. COLOMB. DERECHO INT. 77, 88 (2013); LEW, MISTELIS & 
KRÖLL, supra note 24, at 443 (“This approach . . . is increasingly the norm in 
international arbitration.”). 
 86. LEW, MISTELIS & KRÖLL, supra note 24, at 443. 
 87. Id. 
 88. For an analysis of these issues de lege ferenda, see infra Part V. 
 89. See supra Part III. 
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the most frequently selected seats of arbitral tribunals, namely England 
and Wales, France, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, New 
York in the United States of America.90 Due consideration is paid also to 
key investment arbitration fora. 
The analysis is divided into three parts, reflecting, on a macro level, 
the distinction between commercial and investment arbitration, and, on a 
micro level, the traditional grouping of legal orders into civil law and 
common law jurisdictions. Whereas the former systematization is 
consistent with the tenets of international arbitration, the latter appears 
somewhat alien to its supra-national character, and, as a consequence, it 
might be considered a disservice to the reader. This classification, 
however, is not fortuitous, as the influence of the various legal traditions 
on the respective leges arbitri persists. At the same time, albeit in stark 
contrast to this last observation, this categorization actually amplifies the 
supra-national character of international arbitration, as the discerned legal 
convergence transcends legal families and traditions. Lastly, the adopted 
civil law-common law grouping of the examined jurisdictions offers 
clarity in the structure of Part IV. 
A. The Civil Law Jurisdictions 
The civil law jurisdictions examined herein are Sweden, Switzerland, 
and France. The order of their presentation corresponds with a gradual 
moderation in the application of the jura novit curia principle, that is, from 
a rigid duty of the tribunal to ascertain and apply the law ex officio in 
Sweden to a truncated jura novit curia principle in Switzerland and the 
substitution of this maxim by the more familiar to the French principe de 
la contradiction. 
1. Sweden 
As already suggested, the jura novit arbiter principle has been 
consistently applied in international arbitral proceedings in Sweden. 
Widely recognized as a principle applicable in domestic arbitrations,91 the 
                                                                                                             
 90. See 2015 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY, supra note 8, at 12. 
 91. Svea Hovrätt [HovR] [Svea Court of Appeal] 2017-03-09 T1968-16 
(Swed.) ¶ (“[P]ursuant to the principle of jura novit curia, the arbitrators are not 
bound by the parties’ legal arguments, but are free to decide which provisions of 
the law that apply based on the referenced legal facts. Thus, the arbitrators shall 
not be considered to have exceeded their mandate if they applied a provision of 
the law to the circumstances referenced by the parties in support of their respective 
cases, even if neither of the parties had referenced the relevant legal provision . . 
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absence of a special rule in the Swedish Arbitration Act of 1999 rendered 
the content-of-laws enquiry in international arbitrations seated in Sweden 
anything but clear.92 However, following a rather “timid” first application 
                                                                                                             
. .”); Hovrätten för Västra Sverige [HovR] [Court of Appeal for Western Sweden] 
2015-02-27 T 4028-13 (Swed.) (“[T]he arbitrator is generally entitled (and also 
obliged) to apply legal rules which have not been referenced.”); Svea Hovrätt 
[HovR] [Svea Court of Appeal] 2013-04-29 T6198-12 (Swed.) (“[A]n arbitral 
tribunal is generally allowed (and obliged) to apply a rule of law which has not 
been referenced by the parties.”) (author’s translation from the original); Svea 
Hovrätt [HovR] [Svea Court of Appeal] 2013-10-23 T4487-12 (Swed.) 
(“Typically, a court—as well as an arbitral tribunal—are entitled as well as 
obliged to apply [legal rules or legal arguments] without them being referenced 
under the principle of jura novit curia . . . . Thus, an arbitral tribunal does not 
exceed its mandate by applying a certain legal provision despite the parties not 
having referenced it or by presenting legal arguments that differ from the manner 
in which they were presented by the parties in the arbitration proceedings.”) 
(author’s translation from the original); Bo G.H. Nilsson & Björn Rundblom 
Andersson, Fundamental Principles of International Arbitration in Sweden, in 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 1, 13 (Ulf 
Franke et al. eds., 2013); Robin Oldenstam & Johann Von Pachelbel, Sweden, in 
PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
supra note 72, at 749, 795. 
 92. For an overview of the theories articulated in Swedish legal theory, see 
Christer Danielsson, Applicable Law, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN 
SWEDEN: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, supra note 91, at 137, 148–49. See also 
FREDRIK ANDERSSON ET AL., ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN 119 (Johnny Herre ed., 
2011) (“In international arbitration proceedings in Sweden, the predominant view 
is that the principle [of jura novit curia] does not apply.”); Henrik Fieber & Eva 
Storskrubb, Arbitration in Sweden: Features of the Stockholm Rules, in 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: DIFFERENT FORMS AND THEIR 
FEATURES 321, 334 (Giuditta Cordero-Moss ed., 2013) (“[I]t is still the prevalent 
position among commentators that the principle [of jura novit curia] is not, or 
should not be, applicable to international arbitrations in Sweden.”); Karl 
Guterstam, Jakob Ragnwaldh & Fredrik Andersson, Arbitration Rules of the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (In force as of 1 
January 2010), in CONCISE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 709, 737 (Loukas A. 
Mistelis ed., 2d ed. 2015) (“In international arbitrations taking place in Sweden, 
the principle of jura novit curia does not apply and the parties are usually expected 
to provide evidence on the contents and interpretation of the applicable law.”); 
KAJ HOBÉR, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN 213 (2011) 
(“[I]t is very doubtful if the principle of iura novit curia is applicable in 
international commercial arbitrations conducted in Sweden.”); Nilsson & 
Rundblom Andersson, supra note 91, at 13 (“It is unsettled whether the principle 
[of jura novit curia] applies in international disputes.”); Oldenstam & von 
Pachelbel, supra note 91, at 795 (“[W]ith respect to international arbitrations, 
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of the principle by the Svea Court of Appeal in 2008,93 the very same court, 
in 2014, emphatically ruled that “the arbitrator is generally not bound by 
the parties’ actions as regards legal provisions and arguments, but is rather 
obliged to apply these also without having been referenced by a party 
pursuant to the principle of jura novit curia . . . .”94 
Having said that, it has been argued in Swedish jurisprudence—but 
not confirmed in Swedish caselaw95—that the application of the jura novit 
                                                                                                             
where the applicable law may be more or less familiar to the parties and the 
arbitrators, it is unclear to what extent this principle [of jura novit curia] does in 
fact apply.”). Cf. Proposition [Prop.] 1998/1999:35 Ny lag om skiljeförfarande 
[government bill], at 144–45 (Swed.). 
 93. Svea Hovrätt [HovR] [Svea Court of Appeal] 2008-11-28 T745-06 
(Swed.) (“[T]he arbitral tribunal . . . [has] merely made a legal qualification of 
facts, which [Iurii Bogdanov] pleaded, based on a source of law he relied on. In 
the Court of Appeal’s opinion the principle iura novit curia has not been 
misapplied in these aspects.”) (author’s translation from the original); see also 
Iurii Bogdanov v. Republic of Moldova, Arbitral Award, The Arbitration Institute 
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, ¶ 2.2.1.8 (Sept. 22, 2005) (seat of the 
tribunal in Stockholm, Sweden), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0094_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY54-Z4R5]. 
 94. Svea Hovrätt [HovR] [Svea Court of Appeal] 2014-12-04 T2610-13 
(Swed.) (author’s translation from the original). See Distributor (EU Country) v. 
Manufacturer (EU Country), Final Award, SCC Case No. 158/2011 (2013), 38 
Y.B. COMM. ARB. 253, 262 (seat of the tribunal in Stockholm, Sweden). But see 
Agent (US) v. Principal (Russian Federation), Final Award ICC Case No. 13756 
(2008), 39 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 118, 136 (seat of the tribunal in Stockholm, Sweden) 
(rejecting the claim made for lack of proof of the relevant legal grounds). 
 95. But see Distributor (EU Country) v. Manufacturer (EU Country), Final 
Award, SCC Case No. 158/2011 (2013), 38 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 253, 262 (seat of 
the tribunal in Stockholm, Sweden) (“The Sole Arbitrator notes that the principle 
iura novit curia . . . applies also in international arbitration . . . provided that the 
parties are given the opportunity to be heard and are not taken by surprise.”); Iurii 
Bogdanov v. Republic of Moldova, Arbitral Award, The Arbitration Institute of 
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, ¶ 2.2.1.8, 4.2.2.2 (Sept. 22, 2005) (seat of 
the tribunal in Stockholm, Sweden), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files 
/case-documents/ita0094_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6JY-27T9]. For domestic 
arbitrations, see Svea Hovrätt [HovR] [Svea Court of Appeal] 2017-03-09 
T1968-16 (Swed.) (“If the arbitrators consider applying a legal provision that has 
not been referenced by either party, reasons may exist for the arbitrator to bring 
this to the parties’ attention within the framework of procedural guidance, so as 
to avoid surprises.”).  
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arbiter principle should always be followed by an invitation to the parties 
to amend their legal submissions.96 
2. Switzerland 
The jura novit arbiter principle is applicable also in international 
arbitrations seated in Switzerland,97 albeit with the proviso of 
“no-surprise” to the parties.98 Despite the lack of any relevant provisions 
                                                                                                             
 96. Danielsson, supra note 92, at 150; FINN MADSEN, COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN: A COMMENTARY ON THE ARBITRATION ACT 
(1999:116) AND THE RULES OF THE ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 193 (3d ed. 2007); Nilsson & Rundblom Andersson, 
supra note 91, at 13; see also MADSEN, supra, at 283 n.51 (noting that this 
requirement is applicable to court proceedings as well). 
 97. Jan Oostergetel and Theodora Laurentius v. The Slovak Republic, Final 
Award, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration, ¶ 141 (Apr. 23, 2012) (seat of the tribunal 
in Geneva, Switzerland), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents 
/ita0933.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8WY-Q4QP]; X (nationality not indicated) v. Y 
(nationality not indicated) and Y2 (nationality not indicated), Award, ICC Case No. 
12073 (2003), 33 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 63, 69–71 (seat of the tribunal in Geneva, 
Switzerland) (embarking, also, on a brief comparative law review of the issue 
examined); Kaufmann-Kohler, “Iura Novit Arbiter”, supra note 33, at 73. Contra 
Consultant (State Y) v. State agency (State Z), State owned bank (State Z), Final 
Award, ICC Case No. 7047 (1994), IV, in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 
32, 37, 41 (Jean-Jacques Arnaldez, Yves Derains & Dominique Hascher eds., 2003) 
(seat of the tribunal in Geneva, Switzerland) (rejecting the argument advanced for lack 
of proof of the relevant legal grounds).  
 98. Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Jun. 9, 2009, 4A_108/2009 
(Switz.); Tribunale federale [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Feb. 27, 2007, 
4P.304/2006 (Switz.); Schweizerisches Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme 
Court] Sep. 28, 2004, 4P.146/2004 (Switz.); Jan Oostergetel and Theodora 
Laurentius v. The Slovak Republic, Final Award, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration, 
¶ 141 (Apr. 23, 2012) (seat of the tribunal in Geneva, Switzerland), 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0933.pdf [https://perma.cc/J 
G4T-6695]; Peter Burckhardt, Article 187 PILS, in ARBITRATION IN SWITZERLAND: 
THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 162, 174 (Manuel Arroyo ed., 2013) (“[I]f the tribunal 
intends to base its decision on legal grounds which have not been pleaded by the 
parties, it should grant the parties the possibility to comment on the law it intends to 
apply, e.g., by way of open questions.”); Pierre A. Karrer & Peter A. Straub, 
Switzerland, in PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION, supra note 72, at 815, 854 Joachim Knoll, Article 182 PILS, in 
ARBITRATION IN SWITZERLAND: THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, supra, at 101, 111 
(Manuel Arroyo ed., 2013); Andrea Meier & Yolanda McGough, Do Lawyers 
Always Have to Have the Last Word? Iura Novit Curia and the Right to Be Heard 
in International Arbitration: An Analysis in View of Recent Swiss Case Law, 32 
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in Chapter 12 of the Swiss Private International Law Act,99 this principle 
is so deeply embedded in the Swiss legal order that one can find blocks of 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court judgments with identical wording on this 
topic. Notably, 
[a]s a general rule, pursuant to the adage jura novit curia, state 
courts or arbitral tribunals may freely assess the legal bearing of 
the facts, and may decide on the basis of rules of law other than 
those invoked by the parties . . . . As an exception, [the parties] 
need to be asked for their views, when the judge or the arbitral 
                                                                                                             
ASA BULL. 490, 491 (2014). On the element of surprise, see Tribunal fédéral [TF] 
[Federal Supreme Court] May 26, 2014, 4A_544/2013 (Switz.) (noting that the 
internationality of the dispute is not sufficient to sustain a “surprise of the parties” 
argument); Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] May 24, 2013, 
4A_476/2012 (Switz.), and Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 9, 
2010, 4A_428/2010 (Switz.) (noting that the agreement of the parties to arbitrate 
their dispute, as well as the diverse legal background of the arbitrators, should be 
taken into consideration for the determination of the “surprising” nature of the legal 
basis of the award); Schweizerisches Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme 
Court] Mar. 16, 2004, 4P.14/2004 (Switz.), and Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal 
Supreme Court] Sept. 30, 2003, 4P.100/2003 (Switz.) (noting that the parties might 
be “surprised” if the legal analysis of the tribunal was unrelated to the elements 
discussed in the arbitral proceedings); Karrer & Straub, supra, at 854 (“The parties 
must be given an opportunity to comment on the theory [applied by the arbitral 
tribunal ‘out of the blue’]. It is, however, unclear when this opportunity was 
sufficiently granted, which makes for a tricky decision towards the close of an 
arbitration.”); Knuts, supra note 24, at 683, 685 (arguing that the fundamental nature 
of the legal concept under examination and the latter’s similarity to the legal basis 
invoked by the parties limit significantly the possibility of taking the parties by 
surprise); Meier & McGough, supra, at 502 (“[T]he threshold for unforeseeable 
legal grounds is high: The Federal Tribunal has adopted a restrictive approach . . . . 
If a legal issue—even a broad one . . .—has been discussed in the proceedings, the 
parties must expect the tribunal to take into account all potential legal aspects of this 
issue, whether or not they were raised by the parties.”). Without reference to the 
caveat of “no-surprise,” see Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 18, 
2011, 4A_214/2011 (Switz.); Schweizerisches Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal 
Supreme Court] Mar. 1, 2002, 4P.200/2001 (Switz.); Mar. 2, 2000, 4P.260/2000.  
 99. Cf. Swiss PILA, art. 16(1) (“The contents of the foreign law shall be 
established by the authority on its own motion. For this purpose, the cooperation 
of the parties may be requested. In matters involving an economic interest, the 
task of establishing foreign law may be assigned to the parties.”) (author’s 
translation from the original). For a direct application of this provision in 
international arbitration, see Schweizerisches Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal 
Supreme Court] Apr 27, 2005, 4P.242/2004 (Switz.).  
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tribunal considers rendering a decision on a norm or a legal 
consideration, which was not invoked in the proceedings, and the 
pertinence of which could not be anticipated by the parties.100 
and 
[t]he principle jura novit curia, which is applicable in arbitral 
proceedings, requires the arbitrators to apply the law ex officio, 
without limiting themselves to the legal arguments advanced by 
the parties. Therefore, they may uphold arguments not advanced 
[by the parties], as these would constitute neither a new nor a 
different claim, but merely a new qualification of the facts of the 
case.101 
Because the seat of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) is located 
in Lausanne, Switzerland,102 this “truncated” jura novit arbiter principle 
is applicable also in all CAS sports arbitrations.103 
3. France 
Following the example of Sweden and Switzerland, the absence of a 
relevant content-of-laws rule in Book IV, Title II (“International 
Arbitration”) of the French Code of Civil Procedure has been mitigated 
with clear instructions from French caselaw.104 However, different from 
                                                                                                             
 100. Author’s translation from the original. For caselaw using this wording, 
see, for example, Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 3, 2016, 
4A_136/2016 (Switz.); Aug. 3, 2016, 4A_202/2016; June 27, 2016, 4A_322/2015; 
May 21, 2015, 4A_634/2014; Apr. 15, 2015, 4A_554/2014; Feb. 5, 2014, 
4A_446/2013; Aug. 5, 2013, 4A_214/2013; July 15, 2013, 4A_188/2013; Oct. 9, 
2012, 4A_110/2012; May 16, 2011, 4A_46/2011; Jan. 12, 2011, 4A_392/2010; 
Dec. 20, 2010, 4A_10/2010; Aug. 3, 2010, 4A_254/2010; Feb. 15, 2010, 
4A_464/2009; Mar. 20, 2009, 4A_3/2009; Feb. 9, 2009, 4A_400/2008; Sept. 26, 
2007, 4P.4/2007; Sept. 21,2007, 4A_220/2007; Feb. 19, 2007, 4P.168/2006. 
 101. Author’s translation from the original. For caselaw using this wording, 
see, for example, Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 28, 2015, 
4A_218/2015 (Switz.); May 21, 2015, 4A_709/2014; Jan. 7, 2011, 4A_440/2010; 
Feb. 15, 2010, 4A_464/2009; Dec. 19, 2001, 4P.114/2001. 
 102. CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION 2017, R28. 
 103. Michael Noth, Article R45 CAS Code, in ARBITRATION IN SWITZERLAND: 
THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, supra note 98, at 976, 978. 
 104. CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] [Civil Procedure Code] (as amended 
in 2011 by Décret 2011-48 du 13 janvier 2011 portant réforme de l’arbitrage 
[Decree 2011-48 reforming the law on arbitration]), JUSC 1025421D, arts. 
1504-1527) (Fr.). In contrast to international arbitration (C.P.C. arts. 1464(1) and 
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the Swedish and Swiss legal orders whereby the jura novit curia principle 
is applicable,105 both the Cour de Cassation and the Paris Court of Appeals 
have ruled that the principle of due process—or, in French, “principe de 
la contradiction”106—requires the arbitral tribunal to consult with the 
parties with respect to any legal grounds that have not been argued by the 
latter but have been introduced into the arbitral proceedings ex officio by 
the arbitrators.107 Such consultations may be dispensed with only if the 
                                                                                                             
1506(3) a contrario), the French Code of Civil Procedure extends the content-of-
laws rule applicable to litigation proceedings to domestic arbitration (C.P.C. arts. 16 
and 1464(2)). Cf. C.P.C. art. 16 (“In all circumstances, the judge must supervise the 
respect of, and he must himself respect, the adversarial principle. In his decision, 
the judge may take into consideration grounds, explanations and documents relied 
upon or produced by the parties only if the parties had an opportunity to discuss 
them in an adversarial manner. He shall not base his decision on legal arguments 
that he has raised sua sponte without having first invited the parties to comment 
thereon.”) (author’s translation from the original). 
 105. See supra Part IV.A.1.–2. 
 106. C.P.C. art. 1510 (“Irrespective of the procedure adopted, the arbitral 
tribunal shall ensure that the parties are treated equally and shall uphold the 
principle of due process.”) (author’s translation from the original); C.P.C. art. 
1520(4) (“An award may only be set aside where: due process was violated.”) 
(author’s translation from the original). See Catherine Kessedjian, Principe de la 
Contradiction et Arbitrage, 1995 REV. ARBITR. 381 (1995). 
 107. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., June 
29, 2011, Bull. civ. I, No. 125 (Fr.) (“[T]he Court of Appeal inferred rightly that by 
failing to invite the parties to make submissions on this point [the different legal 
grounds], the arbitrators disregarded the principle of due process.”) (author’s 
translation from the original); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
matters] 1e civ., June 26, 2013, 2013 REV. ARB. 814 (Fr.); 1e civ., Mar. 14, 2006, 
Bull. civ. I, No. 145 (Fr.); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Sept. 
18, 2012, 2012 REV. ARB. 867, 867 (Fr.); Dec. 3, 2009, 2010 REV. ARB. 112, 114 
(Fr.); Nov. 25, 1997, 1998 REV. ARB. 684, 687 (Fr.); Apr. 6, 1995, 1995 REV. ARB. 
466, 466 (Fr.); Emmanuel Gaillard, France, in PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 72, at 423, 456–57; 
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN, supra note 26, at 949; Stephan Balthasar & 
Roland Ziadé, International Arbitration in France, in INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, COUNTRY REPORTS 
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 353, 374 (Stephan Balthasar ed., 2016); Denis 
Bensaude, French Code of Civil Procedure (Book IV: Arbitration), 2011 (In force 
as from 1 May 2011), in CONCISE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1133, 1152, 1157, 
1183 (Loukas A. Mistelis ed., 2d ed. 2015); Carole Malinvaud & Christian 
Camboulive, Paris, in CHOICE OF VENUE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 322, 
340–41 (Michael Ostrove, Claudia T. Salomo & Bette Shifman eds., 2014); see also 
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 6, 2009, 
2010 REV. ARB. 90, 92 (Fr.) (holding that overabundant additional grounds raised 
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unargued grounds are sufficiently general so as to be covered by the 
pleadings of the parties.108 All in all, French caselaw has acknowledged 
the latitude of the tribunal to look beyond the legal submissions of the 
parties, although the submissions should always be paired with an 
invitation to the parties to address the grounds raised proprio motu.109 
B. The Common Law Jurisdictions 
The common law jurisdictions examined herein are England and 
Wales, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“SAR”), Singapore, 
and the State of New York in the United States of America. The order of 
their presentation corresponds with the influence of the common law 
tradition and the English Arbitration Act of 1996 on the respective legal 
regimes, that is, from setting the legal standard in England and Wales, to 
                                                                                                             
ex officio by the arbitral tribunal cannot justify the annulment of the award). Cf. 
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., June 23, 
2010, 2011 REV. ARB. 446, 448 (Fr.) (affirming Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court 
of appeal] Paris, Jun. 19, 2008, 2010 REV. ARB. 108, which annulled the order of 
exequatur of an arbitral award that was rendered on unpleaded grounds); Yves 
Derains, Observations—Cour d’Appel de Paris (1re Ch. C) 13 Novembre 1997—
Lemeur v. SARL Les Cités Invisibles, 1998 REV. ARB. 709, 711 (1998) (noting 
that the adage jura novit curia has no place in international arbitration [at least in 
arbitrations conducted in France]); POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 26, at 736 
(noting that the jura novit curia principle is not applied “liberally” in France). 
 108. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, May 30, 1996, 1996 
REV. ARB. 645, 648 (Fr.) (“The arbitrators did not add anything to the factual or 
legal basis of the dispute by considering [ex officio] the dispute under the rules of 
equity, given that the legal basis applied by the arbitrators has implicitly, albeit 
necessarily, formed part of the proceedings.”) (author’s translation from the 
original); Nov. 25, 1993, 1994 REV. ARB. 730, 731 (Fr.) (“The [ex officio] reference 
of the arbitral tribunal to the principle of good faith fulfilment [sic] of obligations, 
which, necessarily, forms part of the pleadings, does not violate the principle of due 
process.”) (author’s translation from the original); May 28, 1993, 1995 REV. ARB. 
466, 466 (Fr.) (“[B]y referring [ex officio] to the spirit of the contract, the referees 
have only searched for the common intention of the parties . . . . [T]his is a 
fundamental rule of contract interpretation in French law . . . and . . . it, necessarily, 
forms part of the pleadings . . . . [T]herefore, the motion [to set aside the arbitral 
award] on the grounds of violation of the principle of due process must be rejected.”) 
(author’s translation from the original); Gaillard, supra note 107, at 457; 
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN, supra note 26, at 950. 
 109. Because this caselaw rule is identical with the content-of-laws rule 
applicable to domestic arbitrations under C.P.C. articles 16 and 1464(2), one 
cannot help but wonder why the French legislator did not extend the application 
of article 16 to international arbitration (C.P.C. 1506(3) a contrario). 
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the legal transplantation of the English content-of-laws rule to Hong Kong 
and Singapore, and, finally, the enigmatic regulatory vacuum in the State 
of New York. 
1. England and Wales 
Interestingly, in England, the “Queen” of all common law jurisdictions 
that treat foreign law as “facts”—even if considered “facts of a peculiar 
kind,”110—the Arbitration Act of 1996111 allows the tribunal to decide 
whether to adopt an inquisitorial or an adversarial stance in the 
proceedings112 unless an agreement exists between the parties.113 Equally 
interesting is the lack of reported caselaw on the application of § 34(2)(g) 
on the ascertainment of the governing law. Granted, this discretion of the 
tribunal under the “chameleon” regime of § 34(2)(g) is not limitless, as the 
proceedings should always conform to the general principles of arbitration 
enshrined in the Act.114 Against this background, English caselaw requires, 
                                                                                                             
 110. Parkasho v. Singh [1967] 2 W.L.R. 946 (Eng.). 
 111. English Arbitration Act, supra note 48, c. 23.  
 112. Id. § 34(2)(g) (“Procedural and evidential matters include—whether and to 
what extent the tribunal should itself take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and 
the law”). See B.R. Cantrell, E.P. Cantrell v. Wright & Fuller Ltd. [2003] EWHC 
(TCC) 1545, [181] (Eng.). For the adoption of the inquisitorial approach, at least, 
by the minority, see B v. A, [2010] EWHC (Comm) 1626, [21] (Eng.). Cf. ED & F 
Man Sugar Ltd. v. Belmont Shipping Ltd. [2011] EWHC (Comm) 2992, [21] (Eng) 
(“[The] [a]rbitrators are not barred from asking a party whether it has considered 
raising a different case from that which it has advanced but section 33 of the 
Arbitration Act 1996 does not oblige them to do so . . . . Such questions may be 
asked by a tribunal anxious to understand the basis upon which a case is being 
advanced.”); F Ltd. v. M Ltd. [2009] EWHC (TCC) 275, [44] (Eng.) (“Whilst the 
emphasis in arbitration and litigation will always be on those particular matters on 
which the defendant has raised a positive case, a claimant always has the burden of 
ensuring that the A to Z of its pleaded case . . . is both workable and properly 
explained to the Tribunal. That responsibility cannot be shrugged off to the 
defendant or the Tribunal itself.”). 
 113. English Arbitration Act, supra note 48, §§ 4(1), (2), 34(2)(g), sch. 1. See 
FRASER DAVIDSON, ARBITRATION 375 (2d ed. 2012) (“The parties might of 
course remove or curtail the tribunal’s freedom in this regard, e.g. by insisting that 
the procedure must be entirely inquisitorial or entirely adversarial or by imposing 
a specific procedure or indeed a specific procedural law on the parties.”). 
 114. See, e.g., English Arbitration Act, supra note 48, § 1 (“The provisions of 
this Part are founded on the following principles, and shall be construed 
accordingly—(a) the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of 
disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense; (b) the 
parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to 
2018] REVISITING THE “CONTENT-OF-LAWS” ENQUIRY 849 
 
 
 
under the head of “serious irregularity,”115 that the parties be given the 
opportunity to present their case and be heard.116 Therefore, when the 
                                                                                                             
such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest; (c) in matters governed by 
this Part the court should not intervene except as provided by this Part.”); id. § 33 
(“(1) The tribunal shall—(a) act fairly and impartially as between the parties, 
giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with 
that of his opponent, and (b) adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the 
particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair 
means for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined. (2) The tribunal 
shall comply with that general duty in conducting the arbitral proceedings, in its 
decisions on matters of procedure and evidence and in the exercise of all other 
powers conferred on it.”); see also DAVID ST. JOHN SUTTON, JUDITH GILL & 
MATTHEW GEARING, RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION 243–44 (24th ed. 2015). 
 115. English Arbitration Act, supra note 48, § 68 (“(1) A party to arbitral 
proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) apply to the 
court challenging an award in the proceedings on the ground of serious 
irregularity affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the award. A party may lose 
the right to object (see section 73) and the right to apply is subject to the 
restrictions in section 70(2) and (3). (2) Serious irregularity means an irregularity 
of one or more of the following kinds which the court considers has caused or will 
cause substantial injustice to the applicant—(a) failure by the tribunal to comply 
with section 33 (general duty of tribunal); (b) the tribunal exceeding its powers 
(otherwise than by exceeding its substantive jurisdiction: see section 67); (c) 
failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the 
procedure agreed by the parties; (d) failure by the tribunal to deal with all the 
issues that were put to it; (e) any arbitral or other institution or person vested by 
the parties with powers in relation to the proceedings or the award exceeding its 
powers; (f) uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award; (g) the award 
being obtained by fraud or the award or the way in which it was procured being 
contrary to public policy; (h) failure to comply with the requirements as to the 
form of the award; or (i) any irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings or in 
the award which is admitted by the tribunal or by any arbitral or other institution 
or person vested by the parties with powers in relation to the proceedings or the 
award. (3) If there is shown to be serious irregularity affecting the tribunal, the 
proceedings or the award, the court may—(a) remit the award to the tribunal, in 
whole or in part, for reconsideration, (b) set the award aside in whole or in part, 
or (c) declare the award to be of no effect, in whole or in part. The court shall not 
exercise its power to set aside or to declare an award to be of no effect, in whole 
or in part, unless it is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the matters 
in question to the tribunal for reconsideration. (4) The leave of the court is 
required for any appeal from a decision of the court under this section.”); see also 
id. §§ 33–34. 
 116. Lorand Shipping Ltd. v. Davof Trading (Africa) BV (Ocean Glory) 
[2014] EWCH (Comm) 3521, [25] (Eng.) (“[W]here a Tribunal wishes to adopt a 
course not advocated by either party, it is generally incumbent upon the Tribunal 
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tribunal decides to follow the jura novit arbiter principle,117 it should 
solicit further submissions from the arbitrating parties on the legal grounds 
that were not invoked by the latter118 but which were introduced ex officio 
by the arbitrators.119 Be that as it may, considering that § 68, firstly, sets a 
                                                                                                             
to give the parties an opportunity to address it on that possible course before it is 
finally adopted. Depending on the circumstances, failure to do so will—or at least 
may—amount to a serious irregularity.”); London Underground Ltd. v. Citylink 
Telecomm. Ltd. [2007] EWHC (TCC) 1749, [37] (Eng.) (“It will generally be the 
duty of a tribunal to determine an arbitration on the basis of the cases which have 
been advanced by each party, and of which each has notice. To decide a case on the 
basis of a point which was not raised as an issue or argued, without giving the parties 
the opportunity to deal with it, will be a procedural irregularity.”); F Ltd., [2009] 
EWHC (TCC) at [56] (“It appears that there has been an error by the majority, which 
arose because the Arbitral Tribunal did not raise this entirely new analysis with the 
parties, and did not ask for submissions on the novel line of reasoning . . . . Whilst I 
at once accept that the majority may well have been led into this error by the 
muddled and prolix nature of both sides’ pleadings, that cannot mean—in 
circumstances where a point has been decided against a party without it ever having 
been heard on that point—that a serious irregularity has not occurred.”); Pacol Ltd. 
v. Joint Stock Co. Rossakhar [1999] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 778, [787] (Eng.) (“[W]hat 
has happened in this case is that an award has been made on a basis which the 
claimants never had a reasonable opportunity of making the subject of their 
submissions or the subject of evidence . . . . In those circumstances, I have no 
hesitation in concluding that there has in the present case been a serious irregularity 
within the meaning of s. 68(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996.”); see also ABB AG v. 
Hochtief Airport GmbH [2006] EWHC (Comm) 388, [80] (Eng.) (noting that 
erroneous conclusions as to the content of the applicable law do not amount to 
“serious irregularity”); Cameroon Airlines v. Transnet Ltd. [2004] EWHC (Comm) 
1829, [111] (Eng.) (“[T]he Tribunal went its own way to a conclusion which neither 
Camair nor Transnet had contended for and did so unheralded. That, in my 
judgment, was fundamentally unfair.”). 
 117. See SUTTON, GILL & GEARING, supra note 114, at 243–44 (“Arbitrations 
seated in England are rarely conducted under the inquisitorial approach in its true 
sense, save to an extent in the context of ‘quality’ arbitrations relating to 
commodity sales.”). 
 118. See Terna Bahrain Holding Co. WLL v. Al Shamsi [2012] EWHC 
(Comm) 3283, [106] (Eng.) (“Provided the issue is raised, however briefly, the 
opposing party has an opportunity to address it at whatever length and in whatever 
detail he chooses. If he chooses to invite the tribunal to reject it without addressing 
it in detail, that may well be a sensible tactic, in order to avoid the risk of giving 
it more weight and prominence that the party advancing it has done. But that is 
not the same as having been deprived of an opportunity of addressing it, still less 
of an unfair procedure having been adopted.”). 
 119. See Manuel Arroyo, Which is The Better Approach to Jura Novit 
Arbiter—The English or the Swiss?, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
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“high threshold” for “serious irregularity”120 and, secondly, requires that 
the applicant has suffered “substantial injustice” as a result of the “serious 
procedural irregularity,”121 the annulment of the arbitral award for failure 
to invite further legal submissions by the parties would be exceptional. 
                                                                                                             
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2010, at 27, 38–40 (Christopher Müller & Antonio 
Rigozzi eds., 2010) (citing relevant caselaw); DAVIDSON, supra note 113, at 375 
(“[I]t should be noted that operating inquisitorially does not allow the tribunal to 
exclude the parties from the process, and that it will amount to a serious 
irregularity if, e.g. the tribunal questions a witness in the absence of the parties or 
seeks to rely on the views of its own expert without giving the parties an 
opportunity to comment on those views.”); see also SUTTON, GILL & GEARING, 
supra note 114, at 156–57, 162, 509–10. 
 120. Lesotho Highlands Dev. Auth. v. Impregilo SpA [2005] UKHL 43 [28] 
(Eng.) (“[Serious irregularity] is a new concept in English arbitration law. Plainly 
a high threshold must be satisfied.”). 
 121. F Ltd., [2009] EWHC (TCC) at [34] (“It is impossible to say that there 
has been a substantial injustice in circumstances where an unpleaded alternative 
basis of claim . . . has been expressly considered and rejected by the majority.”); 
OAO N. Shipping Co. v Remolcadores de Marin SL (The Remmar) [2007] 
EWHC (Comm) 1821, [26] (Eng.) (“The Court’s task on this type of application 
is not to second-guess the tribunal’s views on any additional submissions which 
[the party seeking annulment] might have made if called upon to do so. It is 
sufficient if [the party seeking annulment has] been deprived of the opportunity 
to advance submissions which were ‘at least reasonably arguable,’ or even simply 
something better than ‘hopeless.’”); Vee Networks Ltd. v. Econet Wireless Int’l 
Ltd. [2004] EWHC (Comm) 2909, [90] (Eng.) (“The element of serious injustice 
in the context of section 68 does not in such a case depend on the arbitrator having 
come to the wrong conclusion as a matter of law or fact but whether he was caused 
by adopting inappropriate means to reach one conclusion whereas had he adopted 
appropriate means he might well have reached another conclusion favourable to 
the applicant. Thus, where there has been an irregularity of procedure, it is enough 
if it is shown that it caused the arbitrator to reach a conclusion unfavourable to the 
applicant which, but for the irregularity, he might well never have reached, 
provided always that the opposite conclusion is at least reasonably arguable. 
Above all it is not normally appropriate for the court to try the material issue in 
order to ascertain whether substantial injustice has been caused. To do so would 
be an entirely inappropriate inroad into the autonomy of the arbitral process.”); 
Cameroon Airlines, [2004] EWHC (Comm) at [102] (“[W]hat is required to satisfy 
the [substantial injustice] test is indeed an extreme case ‘where the tribunal has gone 
so wrong in its conduct of the arbitration that justice calls out for it to be corrected.’ 
On the other hand . . . I do not think it needs to be shown that the outcome of a 
remission will necessarily or even probably be different but it does need to be 
established that the applicant has been unfairly deprived of an opportunity to present 
its case or make a case which had that not occurred might realistically have led to a 
significantly different outcome.”). 
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2. Hong Kong SAR 
The Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong is an interesting 
case study for the content-of-laws enquiry because the UNCITRAL Model 
Law for the regulation of international arbitral proceedings is applied 
alongside the English “chameleon” regime.122 Specifically, the Hong 
Kong Arbitration Ordinance incorporates the Model Law into Hong Kong 
law.123 With respect to the content-of-laws enquiry, whereas the Model 
Law merely empowers the tribunal to conduct the arbitral proceedings in 
an “appropriate” manner,124 § 56(7) of the Ordinance enshrines a special 
content-of-laws rule, which is nearly identical to § 34(2)(g) of the English 
Arbitration Act.125 However, differently from English law,126 Hong Kong 
courts in annulment proceedings will not examine the application of § 
56(7) against the concepts of “serious irregularity” and “substantial 
injustice”127 but against article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which 
                                                                                                             
 122. For the confusing and nebulous regime on the ascertainment of foreign 
law in People’s Republic of China arbitration, see Yijin Wang, Ascertaining 
Foreign Law in PRC Arbitration, 10 ASIAN INT’L ARB. J. 93 (2014).  
 123. Arbitration Ordinance (2014) Cap. 609, 2, § 4 (H.K.) [hereinafter H.K. 
Arbitration Ordinance]. 
 124. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 27, art. 19(2); H.K. Arbitration 
Ordinance, supra note 123, § 47(2). 
 125. H.K. Arbitration Ordinance, supra note 123, § 56(7) (“Unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties, an arbitral tribunal may, when conducting arbitral 
proceedings, decide whether and to what extent it should itself take the initiative 
in ascertaining the facts and the law relevant to those arbitral proceedings.”). See 
John Choong & Michael J. Moser, Hong Kong SAR, in ASIA ARBITRATION 
HANDBOOK 189, 198 (Michael J. Moser & John Choong eds., 2011) (“In Hong 
Kong, experienced international tribunals are unlikely to adopt the strict technical 
rule that the foreign law is assumed to be identical to Hong Kong law unless it is 
proven as a question of fact by expert evidence. Instead, they will adopt a variety 
of approaches to avoid this technical rule, where appropriate, and usually with the 
agreement of all parties. . . . Conversely, most Hong Kong tribunals would hesitate 
to apply the maxim iura novit curia [the court knows the law] in its most wide-
reaching form. This is in part because of due process concerns, bearing in mind 
the adversarial approach that many counsel in Hong Kong are familiar with. That 
said, many arbitrations in Hong Kong involve difficult but recurring issues of PRC 
law and experienced arbitrators have, in addition to relying on the evidence before 
them, been known to draw on their own knowledge of such issues.”). 
 126. See Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp. v. Shanghai Zhonglu Indus. 
Co. [2011] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 707, 719 (H.K.). 
 127. Cf. H.K. Arbitration Ordinance, supra note 123, § 99 (allowing for opt-in to 
Sch. 2, § 4, which is nearly identical to § 68 of the English Arbitration Act of 1996). 
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enshrines the rule for the setting aside of arbitral awards.128 In that context, 
the Court of First Instance has ruled that, in case the arbitral tribunal 
exercises its power to ascertain the content of the applicable law on its own 
motion, it needs to consult the parties and give them the opportunity to 
make further submissions, particularly when the grounds raised ex officio 
would come as a surprise to the parties. Notably, 
the respondents had no reason to expect the Tribunal to adopt a view 
on PRC law which had not been canvassed in the course of the 
arbitration. 
In such circumstances, the Tribunal should have canvassed with the 
parties the particular provision in the PRC law on the topic and given 
them an opportunity to respond before making a decision on the same. 
The failure of the Tribunal in this regard furnished the respondents with 
a valid ground of complaint under Article 34(2)(a)(ii).129 
This requirement to afford the parties the opportunity to make further 
legal submissions was affirmed in Pacific China Holdings (in liq) v. Grand 
Pacific Holdings.130 In that case, the Court of First Instance found that 
[i]n its award . . . the Tribunal cited other New York authorities, 
to which neither party had been referred, and about which neither 
party had made any submissions. I have always understood that 
the practice was that, when a judge, in the course of preparing his 
judgment, came upon authorities not cited by the parties which the 
judge considered that might be relevant, he should refer them to 
the parties and seek either written or oral submission on those 
authorities. That said, I can find no direct authority to support the 
proposition. That may be because it is self-evident.131 
Notwithstanding the failure of the tribunal to consult with the parties, the 
court dismissed the claims of violation of the right to be heard under article 
34(2) on the grounds that the expertise and stellar background of the 
                                                                                                             
 128. Id. § 81. 
 129. Brunswick Bowling, [2011] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 718 [27–28] (emphasis 
added); id. at 724 [67] (“I do not think the Tribunal can apply its secret view on 
PRC law without giving an opportunity to the parties to address it on the same.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 130. Pac. China Holdings (in liq) v. Grand Pac. Holdings [2011] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 
188 (H.K.). 
 131. Id. at 228 [142]. 
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arbitrators rendered the latter “perfectly capable of dealing with the New 
York law issue, without further submissions.”132 
In short, the arbitration regime of Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region allows the arbitrators to introduce ex officio new legal grounds. An 
invitation for further submissions by the parties would be required in 
exceptional cases only, such as when those unpleaded grounds would 
come as a surprise to the parties. 
3. Singapore 
Following the model of Hong Kong closely, the Singapore 
International Arbitration Act133 adopts the UNCITRAL Model Law,134 
together with a special content-of-laws rule, which provides that “[a]n 
arbitral tribunal shall, unless the parties to an arbitration agreement have 
(whether in the arbitration agreement or in any other document in writing) 
agreed to the contrary, have power to adopt if it thinks fit inquisitorial 
processes.”135 
Although this special rule of § 12(3) does not add much to article 19(2) 
of the Model Law,136 Singaporean courts have ruled that arbitral tribunals 
are not confined to the arguments advanced by the parties.137 Put in the 
affirmative, tribunals in Singapore are allowed to examine sua sponte all 
relevant legal grounds and arguments.138 Insofar as any unpleaded 
                                                                                                             
 132. Id. at 228–29 [144–145]. 
 133. International Arbitration Act, 2002, c. 143(A) (Sing.) [hereinafter 
Singapore International Arbitration Act]. 
 134. Id. § 3. 
 135. Id. § 12(3) (emphasis added). See MARK MANGAN, LUCY REED & JOHN 
CHOONG, A GUIDE TO THE SIAC ARBITRATION RULES 163 (2014) (arguing that § 
12(3) witnesses the convergence between the inquisitorial civil law approach and 
the common law). 
 136. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 27, art. 19(2) (“Failing such 
agreement, the arbitral tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this Law, conduct 
the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate.”). 
 137. Soh Beng Tee & Co. v. Fairmount Dev., [2007] SCCA 28, [65] (Sing.) (“(e) 
The arbitrator . . . is not bound to adopt an either/or approach. He is perfectly entitled 
to embrace a middle path (even without apprising the parties of his provisional 
thinking or analysis) so long as it is based on evidence that is before him.”). 
 138. See PT Prima Int’l Dev. v. Kempinski Hotels, [2012] SGCA 35, [59] 
(Sing.) (“Given that the Arbitrator is a Professor of Law of the National University 
of Singapore, it is not surprising that he thought of all the possible legal 
ramifications that could arise from the facts before him.”); Lim Wei Lee & Alvin 
Yeo, Singapore, in ASIA ARBITRATION HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 671, 678 
(“Most Singapore arbitral tribunals are less likely to adopt the technical rule that 
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argument stems from the submissions of the parties,139 the tribunal need 
not consult further with them.140 Such consultations would be required 
only if the resolution of the dispute on the particular grounds would come 
as a surprise to the parties.141 The “surprising” nature of the grounds will 
be determined on a case-by-case basis, the yardstick being the “dramatic 
departure from the submissions [of the parties].”142 As elucidated by the 
High Court of Singapore in TMM Division Maritima v. Pacific Richfield 
Marine, “The more surprising the decision and its reasoning—ie the more 
inexplicable it is in the light of the evidence and submissions—the more 
likely it is that the arbitral tribunal has crossed from permissible 
discretionary decision-making into the forbidden territory of impermissible 
breach of natural justice.”143 In juxtaposition with this latitude of the 
arbitrators under § 12(3), tribunals seated in Singapore are required to take 
notice of public policy and any relevant overriding mandatory rules.144 
                                                                                                             
foreign law is assumed to be the same as Singapore law unless proven as a 
question of fact by expert evidence[. Parties are, however, free to agree to the 
application of this rule if considered appropriate].”). 
 139. See AQU v. AQV, [2015] SGHC 26, [18] (Sing.) (“[I]t is clear that the 
principles of natural justice are not breached just because an arbitrator comes to a 
conclusion that is not argued by either party as long as that conclusion reasonably 
flows from the parties’ arguments.”). 
 140. TMM Div. Maritima v. Pac. Richfield Marine, [2013] SGHC 186, [65] 
(Sing.) (“[C]ommercial parties appoint arbitrators for their expertise and experience, 
technical, legal, commercial or otherwise. These arbitrators cannot be so 
straightjacketed as to be permitted to only adopt in their conclusions the premises put 
forward by the parties. If an unargued premise flows reasonably from an argued 
premise, I do not think that it is necessarily incumbent on the arbitral tribunal to invite 
the parties to submit new arguments. The arbitral tribunal would be doing nothing 
more than inferring a related premise from one that has been placed before it.”). 
 141. Soh Beng Tee & Co. v. Fairmount Dev., [2007] SCCA 28, [44] (Sing.) 
(“There is now an established line of [English] cases that vividly illustrates the 
principle that arbitrators or judges should not surprise the parties with their own 
ideas.”); id. at [65] (“(e) . . . [the arbitrator is not] expected to consult the parties 
on his thinking process before finalising his award unless it involves a dramatic 
departure from what has been presented to him.”). 
 142. Id. at [65] (“(d) . . . Only in instances such as where the impugned decision 
reveals a dramatic departure from the submissions . . . or arrives at a conclusion 
unequivocally rejected by the parties as being trivial or irrelevant, might it be 
appropriate for a court to intervene . . . the overriding burden on the applicant is 
to show that a reasonable litigant in his shoes could not have foreseen the 
possibility of reasoning of the type revealed in the award.”). 
 143. TMM Div. Maritima, [2013] SGHC at [60]. 
 144. PT Prima Int’l Dev. v. Kempinski Hotels, [2012] SGCA 35, [72] (Sing.) 
(“[P]ublic policy is a question of law which an arbitrator must take cognisance of if 
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Similarly to Hong Kong law, the Singapore IAA deviates from the 
English law requirement of “substantial injustice” to the party seeking the 
annulment of the arbitral award. Specifically, § 24(b) of the IAA requires 
that the application of a surprising legal basis had actually “prejudiced” 
the complaining party.145 Although this requirement “lower[s] the bar to 
establish a remediable ‘prejudice,’”146 the setting aside of an award for the 
use of unpleaded legal grounds remains exceptional. 
Concisely, Singaporean law empowers the arbitrators to explore sua 
sponte the content of the legal regime governing the dispute. The failure 
of the tribunal to invite further submissions by the parties on the arguments 
raised ex officio would lead, only exceptionally, to the annulment of the 
arbitral award. 
4. New York 
New York is the most enigmatic venue with respect to the content-of-laws 
enquiry. In stark contrast to the common law jurisdictions examined above, 
                                                                                                             
he becomes aware of it in the course of hearing the evidence presented during 
arbitral proceedings.”). 
 145. Singapore International Arbitration Act, supra note 133, § 24(b) 
(“Notwithstanding Article 34(1) of the Model Law, the High Court may, in 
addition to the grounds set out in Article 34(2) of the Model Law, set aside the 
award of the arbitral tribunal if—a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred 
in connection with the making of the award by which the rights of any party have 
been prejudiced.”). 
 146. Soh Beng Tee & Co., [2007] SCCA at [91] (“In our view, this difference, 
while noteworthy, is not crucial. The fact that Parliament may have chosen different 
language does not invariably mean that it has intended a wholly different meaning . . 
. . Section 48(1)(a)(vii) of the Act plainly requires the ‘rights’ of ‘any party’ to have 
been ‘prejudiced’ . . . . It does, however, appear that Parliament, in steering away from 
the ‘substantial injustice’ formula adopted in the UK [sic] Arbitration Act 1996, had 
intended to set a lower bar to establish a remediable ‘prejudice’. . . . It appears to us 
that in Singapore, an applicant will have to persuade the court that there has been some 
actual or real prejudice caused by the alleged breach. While this is obviously a lower 
hurdle than substantial prejudice, it certainly does not embrace technical or procedural 
irregularities that have caused no harm in the final analysis. There must be more than 
technical unfairness. . . . What we can say is that to attract curial intervention it must 
be established that the breach of the rules of natural justice must, at the very least, have 
actually altered the final outcome of the arbitral proceedings in some meaningful way. 
If, on the other hand, the same result could or would ultimately have been attained, or 
if it can be shown that the complainant could not have presented any ground-breaking 
evidence and/or submissions regardless, the bare fact that the arbitrator might have 
inadvertently denied one or both parties some technical aspect of a fair hearing would 
almost invariably be insufficient to set aside the award.”). 
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the arbitration laws of New York—the United States Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”) of 1925, as codified and amended,147 and article 75 of the 
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“NY CPLR”)148—do not provide 
for any rules on the method of establishing the content of the applicable 
substantive law.149 This lack of special provisions is aggravated by the 
laconic provisions of both the FAA and the NY CPLR on the conduct of 
arbitral proceedings.150 It is well established, of course, that arbitrators 
enjoy discretion in the conduct of the proceeding.151 This latitude of the 
tribunal, however, does not elucidate the matter. Hence, this regulatory 
vacuum, together with the lack of relevant New York caselaw, has allowed 
for the articulation of both adversarial and inquisitorial approaches to the 
content-of-laws enquiry in arbitrations seated in New York. 
On the one hand, in accordance with the typically adversarial approach 
of the common law, it has been argued that the parties bear the onus of 
educating the arbitral tribunal vis-à-vis the content of the applicable law.152 
This adversarial approach would be consistent also with strong caselaw of 
                                                                                                             
 147. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–12 (2012). 
 148. N.Y. C.P.L.R. art. 75 (MCKINNEY 2013). 
 149. See Tilman Niedermaier, International Arbitration in the U.S., in 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, 
COUNTRY REPORTS AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 107, at 660, 662 
(“[S]tate arbitration law has a narrow application. As it is subject to the federal 
preemption doctrine, state law applies only to the extent that it is consistent with federal 
arbitration law or where inter-state commerce is not concerned. Notwithstanding the 
broad scope of default application of federal law, the parties, as a matter of freedom of 
contract, can agree that the arbitration is governed by state law.”). 
 150. Cf. John V.H. Pierce, Janet R. Carter & David N. Cinotti, Challenging and 
Enforcing International Arbitral Awards in New York Courts, in INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 447, 500 (James H. Carter & John Fellas 
eds., 2d ed. 2016) (“Unlike the FAA and the Conventions, the CPLR contains 
provisions regarding procedures to be followed during the arbitration.”); Peter 
Bowman Rutledge, Rachael Kent & Christian Henel, United States, in 
PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
supra note 72, at 877, 901 (“There is relatively little US legal authority regarding 
the procedures to be followed in an arbitration. Most issues are left to the agreement 
of the parties (including their agreement as to any particular procedural rules) and 
to the discretion of the arbitral tribunal.”). 
 151. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 57 
(5th ed. 2014); Rutledge, Kent & Henel, supra note 150, at 901. 
 152. Rutledge, Kent & Henel, supra note 150, at 920 (“Consistent with its 
common law tradition, the general expectation and practice in US arbitration is 
for the parties to provide the tribunal with the applicable legal authorities and 
written argument applying those authorities to the specific facts of the case.”). 
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit153 on the 
common law ground for the annulment of arbitral awards, namely the 
“manifest disregard of the law.”154 Although the “manifest disregard of the 
law” presupposes the ascertainment of the applicable law—thus risking 
“putting the cart before the horse”—further examination of this ground 
could contribute to the holistic approach of the content-of-laws enquiry in 
New York-seated arbitrations. Specifically, setting aside the question of 
whether the “manifest disregard of the law” has survived Hall Street 
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,155 the Second Circuit has ruled that the 
application of this ground has three requirements: (1) “the law that was 
allegedly ignored was clear, and in fact explicitly applicable to the matter 
before the arbitrators”; (2) “the law was in fact improperly applied, leading 
to an erroneous outcome”; and (3) “the arbitrator must have known of [the 
law’s] existence and its applicability to the problem before him.”156 For 
the needs of this analysis, emphasis should be put on this subjective third 
requirement—knowledge of the arbitrator. The Second Circuit has held 
also that, with respect to this subjective element, only the legal knowledge 
                                                                                                             
 153. The State of New York lies in the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit. 
 154. The “manifest disregard of the law” as a ground for the setting aside of 
arbitral awards was first articulated in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 
(1953), which was overruled on different grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (“[T]he interpretations of the 
law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the 
federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”). 
 155. Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008) (“In holding 
that §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the review provided by the statute, 
we do not purport to say that they exclude more searching review based on authority 
outside the statute as well. The FAA is not the only way into court for parties 
wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate enforcement under 
state statutory or common law, for example, where judicial review of different scope 
is arguable.”); see also Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 
(2010) (“We do not decide whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in 
Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008), as an independent 
ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set 
forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.”). For the proposal that this ground is still applicable in New 
York courts, see Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“In addition to the section 10(a) grounds for vacatur, we have recognized a 
judicially-created ground, namely that ‘an arbitral decision may be vacated when an 
arbitrator has exhibited a manifest disregard of law.’”); Porzig v. Dresdner, 
Kleinwort, Benson, N. America, L.L.C., 497 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 156. Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping, 333 F.3d 383, 389–
90 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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“introduced” by the parties may be imputed on the tribunal.157 Therefore, 
it appears that, at least for the application of this ground of annulment, the 
arbitrators have no obligation to ascertain the content of the applicable 
substantive law. 
On the other hand, given the paucity of pertinent New York caselaw and 
the great similarities among the various state legislations and the Federal 
Arbitration Act, one could look for guidance in the jurisprudence and legal 
practice in other states. Thus, a domestic arbitration case from New Jersey 
could be of assistance in such an endeavor. Specifically, in the context of 
appellate proceedings for the setting aside of an arbitral award rendered on 
legal grounds raised by neither party, the Superior Court of New Jersey ruled 
in Township of Montclair v. Montclair PBA Local (“Montclair”) that 
the problem here [is] one of fundamental fairness to a party in 
arbitration . . . the arbitrator utterly disregarded the arguments of 
both sides and decided the case on the basis of a provision that 
neither party cited, relied upon or even had notice was at issue. 
Such action constitutes a type of procedural misbehavior 
prejudicial to the rights of a party and is sufficient to warrant 
                                                                                                             
 157. Goldman v. Architectural Iron Co., 306 F.3d 1214, 1216 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“Manifest disregard can be established only where a governing legal principle is 
‘well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case,’ and where the arbitrator 
ignored it after it was brought to the arbitrator’s attention in a way that assures that 
the arbitrator knew its controlling nature.”); Duferco, 333 F.3d at 390 (“In 
determining an arbitrator’s awareness of the law, we impute only knowledge of 
governing law identified by the parties to the arbitration.”); DiRussa v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, 121 F.3d 818, 823 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Moreover, ‘knowing’ all of the 
provisions of a particular statutory scheme without assistance from the parties is a 
daunting task, even for a skilled lawyer or judge. DiRussa argues that ‘[a] competent 
and conscientious panel, knowing it was being called upon to enforce federal and 
state anti-discrimination statutes, would be sure to review these statutes in order to 
ensure its compliance therewith and would request briefing from the parties on any 
issue on which it was unclear.’ While this would be a prudent course of action for 
arbitrators dealing with statutory claims, we agree with the district court that their 
failure to do so did not constitute manifest disregard of the law.”); Wallace v. Buttar, 
378 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (“In sum, a court reviewing an arbitral award 
cannot presume that the arbitrator is capable of understanding and applying legal 
principles with the sophistication of a highly skilled attorney. Indeed, this is so far 
from being the case that an arbitrator ‘under the test of manifest disregard is 
ordinarily assumed to be a blank slate unless educated in the law by the parties.’ 
Goldman, 306 F.3d at 1216.”). See Pierce, Carter & Cinotti, supra note 150, at 494 
(“It is not enough that a reasonable arbitrator would have known of, and applied, 
the relevant law; instead, the court looks only to the law that was expressly cited to 
the arbitrator by the parties.”).  
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vacating the award under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(c) . . . . By predicating 
his ruling upon an issue that neither party raised nor had notice of, 
the arbitrator effectively denied the parties the right to marshal 
evidence and be heard on the pivotal issue identified by the 
arbitrator. Fundamental fairness requires, at the very least, notice 
of claim and the right to be heard.158 
Considering N.J.S.A. § 2A:24-8(c)159 is nearly identical to FAA § 
10(a)(3)160—the “catch-all provision [ensuring] basic procedural due 
process”161—it would be apposite to transpose the holding of the New 
Jersey appellate court into international arbitrations conducted under the 
FAA rules. Hence, arbitral tribunals would be allowed—not required—to 
resolve disputes on unargued legal bases with the proviso that the parties 
have been advised accordingly and given the opportunity to address the 
new legal grounds. That being said, it is noteworthy that this approach has 
been enshrined in the draft of the Third Restatement of the Law on the 
United States Law of International Commercial Arbitration, which 
provides that “[a]n arbitral tribunal is not precluded from raising factual 
or legal issues sua sponte during the proceedings. However, the tribunal 
must then afford the parties an opportunity to address and respond to those 
issues.”162 
                                                                                                             
 158. Twp. of Montclair v. Montclair PBA Local No. 53, No. A-0657-11T4, 
2012 WL 1836090, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 22, 2012). 
 159. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-8 (West 2017) (“The court shall vacate the 
award in any of the following cases: . . . (c). Where the arbitrators were guilty of 
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being 
shown therefor, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the 
controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party.”). 
 160. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2012) (“In any of the following cases the United 
States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order 
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration—where the 
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon 
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to 
the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have 
been prejudiced.”). 
 161. Pierce, Carter & Cinotti, supra note 150, at 493. 
 162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 4-13, Reporters’ Notes, at 186 (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012); id. § 5-9, Reporters’ Notes, at 111 (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2010); see also id. at 192, 113, respectively (“The absence 
of substantive appellate review of arbitral awards requires that parties be afforded 
an opportunity to address all material arguments in the first instance and denial of 
such an opportunity may be regarded as a significant procedural defect.”). 
2018] REVISITING THE “CONTENT-OF-LAWS” ENQUIRY 861 
 
 
 
It should be expected that the prestige of the American Law Institute 
(“ALI”) and the elevated status of Restatements as authoritative 
expressions of United States law will serve as driving forces for the 
application of the Montclair approach in New York and the United States 
in general.163 
C. The Investment Arbitration Experience 
Transposing the content-of-laws enquiry into investment arbitration, 
it is only logical that the public international law nature of investment 
disputes would introduce a new dimension to the topic—the distinction 
between national and international law. Generally speaking, in 
international dispute settlement, the jura novit curia principle covers only 
international law164 whereas the contents of any relevant national laws will 
need to be proven as plain facts by the parties.165 In investor-state disputes, 
however, the closely intertwined application of public international law 
and national law mandates the expansion of the jura novit curia principle 
to national law as well.166 This “deviating” position has become the norm 
                                                                                                             
 163. See Rutledge, Kent & Henel, supra note 150, at 880 (“[O]nce [the 
Restatement of the Law on International Commercial Arbitration] is completed, 
it should have an important impact on future legal developments in this area.”). 
 164. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. v. Ice.), 
Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 17 (July 25) (“The Court . . . as an international judicial 
organ, is deemed to take judicial notice of international law, and is therefore required 
. . . to consider on its own initiative all rules of international law which may be relevant 
to the settlement of the dispute. . . . [T]he burden of establishing or proving rules of 
international law cannot be imposed upon any of the parties, for the law lies within 
the judicial knowledge of the Court.”) (emphasis added) (a contrario). 
 165. Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. 
v. Pol.), Judgment, 1926 P.C.I.J. ser. A No. 7, at 19 (May 25) (“From the 
standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its organ, municipal 
laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States, 
in the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures.”). 
 166. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 95 (2009); see also Giuditta 
Cordero-Moss, Tribunal’s Powers Versus Party Autonomy, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1207, 1210 (Peter Muchlinski, 
Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008) (“Within the framework of 
ICSID, it seems to be undisputed that a tribunal is not bound to base its award on 
the legal arguments that were presented to it by the parties.”); Carlos Ignacio Suarez 
Anzorena, Vivendi v. Argentina: On the Admissibility of Requests for Partial 
Annulment and the Ground of a Manifest Excess of Powers, in ANNULMENT OF 
ICSID AWARDS 123, 143 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds., 2004) 
(arguing that the jura novit curia principle does not cover non-pleaded grounds of 
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in investment arbitration, as evidenced in numerous cases resolved under 
the ICSID Convention,167 as well as in other investment arbitration fora.168 
Most recently, the ICSID tribunal in Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic 
of Ecuador ruled that 
[w]hen applying the law (whether national or international), . . . 
the Tribunal is of the view that it is not bound by the arguments 
and sources invoked by the Parties. The principle iura novit 
curia—or better in this instance, iura novit arbiter—allows the 
Tribunal to form its own opinion of the meaning of the law, 
provided that it does not rely on a legal theory that was not subject 
to debate or that the Parties could not anticipate or address.169 
                                                                                                             
annulment of ICSID awards). Cf. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on the Application for Partial Annulment of 
Continental Casualty Company and the Application for Partial Annulment of the 
Argentine Republic, ¶ 272 (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default 
/files/case-documents/ita0231.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6SH-NFNG]. 
 167. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]. See Metal-Tech Ltd. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 287 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.italaw.com 
/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3012.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR39-LZCH]; 
Bosh Int’l, Inc. and B&P Ltd. Foreign Investments Enterprise v. Ukraine, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/08/11, Award, ¶ 30 (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default 
/files/case-documents/italaw1118.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X75-CVWU]; see also 
Garanti Koza LLP v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/20, Dissenting 
Opinion, n.16 (Jul. 3, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1541.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5R9-SNYP]. 
 168. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar. 15, 2016, (seat of 
the tribunal in Paris, France), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7208.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG53-2U86]; Jan Oostergetel and 
Theodora Laurentius v. The Slovak Republic, Final Award, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc 
Arbitration, ¶ 141 (Apr. 23, 2012) (seat of the tribunal in Geneva, Switzerland), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0933.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/5WR8-C9NW]; Iurii Bogdanov, Agurdino-Invest Ltd., and Agurdino-Chimia JSC 
v. Republic of Moldova, Arbitral Award, The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, ¶ 2.2.1.8 (Sept. 22, 2005) (seat of the tribunal in Stockholm, 
Sweden), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0094_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4LWJ-2NLS]. 
 169. ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Reconsideration and Award, ¶ 45 
(Feb. 7, 2017) (emphasis added), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw8208_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EKN-XME6]. With nearly 
identical wording, see Vestey Group Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/4, Award, ¶ 118 (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.italaw.com 
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Hence, it is clear that even in investment arbitration a moderate jura novit 
arbiter principle is applicable with the proviso of the “no-surprise” rule.170 
                                                                                                             
/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7230.pdf [https://perma.cc/C74S-YWMJ]; 
Quiborax SA and Non Metallic Minerals SA v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/2, Award, ¶ 92 (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites 
/default/files/case-documents/italaw4389.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K2H-UEPG]. For a 
similar proposition, see Orascom TMT Investments S.à.r.l. v. People’s Democratic 
Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/35, Award, ¶ 140, http://www.italaw 
.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8973.pdf [https://perma.cc/TD64-5X9T]; 
Daimler Financial Services AG v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, 
Decision on Annulment, ¶ 295 (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default 
/files/case-documents/italaw4092.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS93-N28L]; see also 
Caratube Int’l. Oil Co. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/12, 
Decision on the Annulment Application of Caratube International Oil Company LLP, 
¶ 95 (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw 
3082.pdf [https://perma.cc/C955-SJUY]. For the proposition that the arbitral tribunal 
enjoys discretion as to the introduction of different legal grounds for the resolution of 
the dispute, see Mr. Patrick Mitchell v. The Democratic Republic of Congo, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award, ¶ 57 
(Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0537.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZR97-YJ77]; CME Czech Republic BV (The Netherlands) v. The 
Czech Republic, Final Award, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings, ¶ 411 (Mar. 14, 
2003), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0180.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/6TGA-5UQF]. But see Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. and Ponderosa 
Assets, LP v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on the 
Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 375-377 (July 30, 2010), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0299.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/4GEZ-3RSN]. 
 170. See Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/4, Decision on the Application by the Arab Republic of Egypt for 
Annulment of the Arbitral Award dated December 8, 2000, ¶¶ 68-70 (Feb. 5, 2002), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0903.pdf (holding that 
the parties could have anticipated the legal arguments advanced by the Tribunal) 
[https://perma.cc/T2LN-9AAJ]. Contra Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija SA and 
Vivendi Universal (formerly Compagnie Générale des Eaux) v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 84 (July 3, 2002), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0210.pdf (“It may be 
true that the particular approach adopted by the Tribunal in attempting to reconcile 
the various conflicting elements of the case before it came as a surprise to the parties, 
or at least to some of them. But even if true, this would by no means be 
unprecedented in judicial decision-making, either international or domestic, and it 
has nothing to do with the ground for annulment contemplated by Article 52(1)(d) 
of the ICSID Convention.”) (emphasis added) [https://perma.cc/5NHC-Z75J]. See, 
e.g., Christoph Schreuer, Three Generations of ICSID Annulment Proceedings, in 
ANNULMENT OF ICSID AWARDS 17, 31 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi 
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Nonetheless, such surprise of the parties alone, which needs to be invoked 
and proved by the party seeking the annulment of the ICSID award,171 will 
not result in the annulment of the award. Rather, as first articulated in the 
seminal Klöckner I case,172 and most recently affirmed in TECO 
Guatemala Holdings L.L.C. v. Republic of Guatemala,173 the requirements 
for the application of either grounds of annulment—manifest excess of 
powers or serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure174—will 
have to be met as well.175 
D. Convergence of Laws? 
This succinct analysis of the theory and practice of the content-of-laws 
enquiry allows for a series of interesting remarks. To begin with, it is clear 
that the distinction between civil law and common law jurisdictions has 
been preserved. This distinction is manifested in the special rules—or the 
lack thereof—on the content-of-laws enquiry and the explicit reference 
to—or the omission of—the jura novit arbiter principle by arbitral 
tribunals and national courts. 
                                                                                                             
eds., 2004) (“A failure to anticipate an argument that appears convincing to the 
tribunal and the resulting failure to address it does not find a remedy in 
annulment.”). 
 171. Mr. Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Decision on Annulment, ¶ 141 (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites 
/default/files/case-documents/italaw4371.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VDG-QH4K]. 
 172. Klöckner v. Republic of Cameroon, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, Decision 
on the Application for Annulment Submitted by Klöckner against the Arbitral 
Award Rendered on October 21, 1983, ¶ 91 (May 3, 1985), http://icsid.worldbank 
.org/en/Documents/cases/Decision%20of%20the%20ad%20hoc%20Committee_Tra
nslated_ARB.81.2.pdf#search=klockner (“Within the dispute’s ‘legal framework,’ 
arbitrators must be free to rely on arguments which strike them as the best ones, even 
if those arguments were not developed by the parties, although they could have been. 
Even if it is generally desirable for arbitrators to avoid basing their decision on an 
argument that has not been discussed by the parties, it obviously does not follow that 
they therefore commit a ‘serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure.’ 
Any other solution would expose arbitrators to having to do the work of the parties’ 
counsel for them and would risk slowing down or even paralyzing the arbitral solution 
to disputes.”) [https://perma.cc/WR6E-X8HT]. 
 173. TECO Guat. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/23, Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 189-98 (Apr. 5, 2016) (examining the dual 
application requirements under ICSID art. 52(1)(d)), http://www.italaw.com/sites 
/default/files/case-documents/italaw7196.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM5R-YC35]. 
 174. ICSID Convention, supra note 167, arts. 52(1)(b), (d), respectively. 
 175. For an analysis of the ICSID art. 52 application requirements, see 
SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 68, at 890–1095. 
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Specifically, whereas all three civil law jurisdictions examined 
herein—Sweden, Switzerland, and France—do not provide for special 
rules on the ascertainment of the content of the applicable law, the 
common law jurisdictions—England, Hong Kong, and Singapore—have 
enacted such special regimes, with the sole exception to the common law 
“group” being New York. This divergence in the points of departure may 
be explained by the great deference to open-ended rules and general 
principles in the civilian legal tradition, the great influence of English law 
on Hong Kong and Singapore, and, lastly, the general structure of United 
States federal and state laws that contain only a handful of provisions on 
the conduct of arbitral proceedings. 
Furthermore, in juxtaposition with the common law jurisdictions and the 
sui generis regime of France, both Swedish and Swiss courts have extended 
the application of the jura novit curia principle to arbitral proceedings. This 
practice is linked, indisputably, to their familiarity with the principle and the 
readiness of both the Swedish and the Swiss legal industries to accept the 
application of the principle in international arbitration. 
Against this background of different legal traditions and points of 
departure, one cannot fail to observe the legal convergence on the 
content-of-laws enquiry. Contrary to conventional wisdom,176 a trend is 
emerging towards the rejection of both “pure” inquisitorial and adversarial 
approaches and the adoption of a more facultative-discretionary approach 
to the issue in international arbitration. This trend may be described as a 
“dormant” or “potentially inquisitorial” approach. Whereas the principle 
jura novit curia signals both a right and duty of the court to establish the 
legal basis of the dispute,177 pursuant to this emerging approach, the 
arbitrators are merely allowed to look beyond the arguments advanced by 
the parties.178 This approach amounts to the application of a facultative jura 
novit arbiter principle. That said, this prerogative of the tribunal needs to be 
paired, to a greater or lesser extent, with the opportunity of the parties to 
express their opinions on the legal issues raised by the tribunal proprio motu. 
This convergence of national laws toward a “dormant” or “potentially 
inquisitorial” approach is neither coincidental nor a compromise between 
the “extreme” inquisitorial and adversarial approaches. On the contrary, 
                                                                                                             
 176. ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 872 (“The Committee 
has not been able to discern any uniform practice [as to how arbitral tribunals 
determine the content of the lex causae].”). 
 177. See supra Part I. 
 178. Cf. Alberti, supra note 24, at 26 (“In absence of any specific rules or 
trends to the contrary one may argue that the iura novit curia principle should 
then be treated as a tribunal’s right—and not as a duty—to ascertain the contents 
of the law.”). 
866 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
because national courts reviewing arbitral awards in annulment proceedings 
had no regulatory guidance or “safety net” to fall back on, they had to resort 
to the general principles and the theoretical underpinnings of international 
arbitration. Thus, this prevailing approach in legal practice reflects the 
dispute resolution function of arbitral tribunals and the effect of 
fundamental principles, such as party autonomy and due process, on the 
conduct of arbitral proceedings. Accordingly, the latitude enjoyed by the 
tribunal allows the arbitrators to ensure that the pertinent legal issues have 
been duly considered. At the same time, the right of the parties to make 
further submissions on any unpleaded legal grounds allows the parties to 
be in control of the proceedings and the arbitrators to render awards that 
comply with the right of the parties to be heard. This coveted balance 
between the judicial function of the tribunals and the contractual basis of 
arbitration is achieved by the “potentially inquisitorial” approach to the 
content-of-laws enquiry. Lastly, one should not overlook that the emergence 
of this uniform approach clearly depicts the “practical harmonization” of 
arbitration regimes179 and the cross-fertilization achieved by the truly global 
practice of arbitration and the formation of multi-cultural arbitral tribunals.  
What remains unsettled in practice, however, are the circumstances 
under which the tribunal would be required to afford the parties the 
opportunity to make further legal submissions as well as the effects of 
international public policy and overriding mandatory rules on the discretion 
of the arbitral tribunal. Should the tribunal revert to the parties every time 
the arbitrators use their inquisitorial powers or only if the new legal grounds 
could possibly come as a surprise to the parties? How should the tribunal 
exercise its discretion? Should the arbitrators consider sua sponte issues of 
international public policy and the application of overriding mandatory 
rules, or should the latter have no effect on the facultative jura novit arbiter 
principle? These issues are examined in Part V under a de lege ferenda 
analysis of the content-of-laws enquiry in international arbitration. 
V. DE LEGE FERENDA 
Considering, firstly, the drawbacks of the fall-back, inquisitorial, and 
adversarial approaches, and, secondly, the emerging trend towards a 
“potentially inquisitorial” approach, clear regulatory preference seems to 
exist, in both legal theory and practice, for the adoption of a hybrid approach 
to the ascertainment of the content of the applicable law by arbitral tribunals. 
                                                                                                             
 179. Compare with the largely unsuccessful legal harmonization and unification 
attempts under international uniform law instruments. 
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It is not clear, however, what this approach entails.180 Given the gap in 
national legal regimes, soft-law projects could be of assistance in delineating 
a method of identifying the content of the governing law. Accordingly, the 
ILA International Commercial Arbitration Committee’s Report and 
Recommendations on “Ascertaining the Contents of the Applicable Law in 
International Commercial Arbitration,”181 which adopts such a hybrid 
approach, is used as the point of reference for the analysis that follows. 
The ILA Report and Recommendations stipulates that the parties bear 
the onus of educating the arbitral tribunal with respect to the content of the 
applicable law.182 The arbitrators, however, are not limited by the parties’ 
submissions, as they may research the disputed legal issues on their own 
motion.183 Should the arbitrators intend to render an award relying on 
sources not invoked by the parties, the tribunal should afford the latter the 
opportunity to amend their submissions.184 The opportunity to amend the 
submissions is appropriate “at least if those sources go meaningfully 
beyond [those] . . . already invoked[,] and [if they] might significantly 
affect the outcome of the case.”185 Thus, the introduction of legal 
arguments merely corroborating the arguments of the parties should not 
mandate, prima facie, further hearing of the parties on the new sources.186 
It is important to distinguish independent legal research by the tribunal 
from the consideration of legal issues that have not been raised in the 
parties’ submissions. Whereas the first act pertains to the argumentation 
on a legal issue falling clearly within the mandate of the tribunal, unargued 
issues bear on the scope of the arbitration agreement. The arbitrators 
should not contemplate legal issues that have not been raised by the parties 
because such practices could bring the tribunal outside its mandate.187 Put 
differently, the legal characterization of the dispute by the parties and the 
                                                                                                             
 180. See supra Part III.E. 
 181. ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17. 
 182. Id. at 881, Recommendation No. 5. 
 183. Id. at 881, Recommendation No. 7. 
 184. Id. at 882, Recommendation No. 10. See Mantakou, supra note 68, at 497 
(noting that this requirement for consultations with the parties leads, essentially, to a 
gradual reshaping of the classic jura novit curia principle into “jura non novit curia”). 
 185. See Mantakou, supra note 68; see also, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 6, 2009, 2010 REV. ARB. 90, 92 
(holding that overabundant additional grounds raised ex officio by the arbitral 
tribunal cannot justify the annulment of the award). 
 186. See Sanghi Polyesters (India) Ltd. v. Int’l Investor (KCFC) (Kuwait) 
[2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 480 [26], [28] (Eng.); see also Giovannini, supra note 48, 
at 6 (“To the best of our knowledge, the insertion in the award of legal references 
not mentioned by the parties has never given rise to any challenge whatsoever.”). 
 187. ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 881, Recommendation No. 6. 
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relevant arguments advanced delimit the legal arsenal of the arbitral 
tribunal. Should the arbitrators qualify the legal dispute in a different way 
or resolve the dispute on a different legal basis from that envisaged by the 
parties188—let alone grant relief not requested by the latter189—they would 
act extra or ultra petita,190 that is, in violation of their mandate under the 
arbitration agreement.191 By acting extra or ultra petita, the tribunal risks 
the setting aside192 or the limited enforceability193 of the award—if it is 
enforceable at all.194 If, however, the parties have focused on the relief 
sought without legally qualifying the dispute,195 the tribunal would be 
allowed to render an award on any legal grounds, albeit within the limits of 
the remedy requested.196 
Nevertheless, new issues raised sua sponte by the arbitrators should not 
be prohibited altogether. In exceptional circumstances—when overriding 
                                                                                                             
 188. For example, adjudicating a claim on the basis of unjust enrichment rather 
than breach of contract. 
 189. For example, ruling for the termination of the contract rather than the 
award of damages, awarding non-requested damages or interest, etc. See, e.g., 
Louis Dreyfus S.A.S. v. Holding Tusculum B.V., 2008 QCCS 5903 (Can. QC).  
 190. Claus von Wobeser, The Effective Use of Legal Sources: How Much Is Too 
Much and What Is the Role for Iura Novit Curia?, in ARBITRATION ADVOCACY IN 
CHANGING TIMES 207, 212–13 (Albert Jan Van den Berg ed., 2011). 
 191. See UNCITRAL, Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, nn.11(a), 
11(c). But see Dimolitsa, supra note 64, at 438 (“[T]he principle of ‘ne ultra petita 
partium’ does not enter into play as much when arbitrators introduce ex officio 
new issues of law. Indeed, introducing new issues of law does not equate with 
granting non-requested remedies. It is not excluded, however, that a party 
challenges an award for violation of this very principle in situations where 
arbitrators have raised new issues or have recharacterized legal relationships; but 
such challenge should normally fail as long as the arbitrators have ultimately 
adjudicated not more or other than what was claimed.”). 
 192. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 27, art. 34(1), (2)(a)(iii). 
 193. See, e.g., New York Convention, supra note 38, art. V(1)(c); UNCITRAL 
Model Law, supra note 27, art. 36(1)(a)(iii). 
 194. For a brief analysis of the ultra petita concept, see MATTI S. KURKELA, 
SANTTU TURUNEN & CONFLICT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE (“COMI”), DUE 
PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 28 (2d ed. 2010); 
Cordero-Moss, supra note 26, at 2 (“[T]he tribunal would clearly exceed its 
power, if it ordered a relief that the parties have excluded in the arbitration 
agreement.”). See also Jones, supra note 56, at 121 (“A challenge to the award or 
its enforcement will probably be refuted where the party alleging that the tribunal 
exceeded its jurisdiction was given sufficient notice and failed to make any 
objections to the tribunal taking that course of action . . . .”). 
 195. Such as damages sought on contract law, rather than tort law, grounds. 
 196. Alberti & Bigge, supra note 34, at 14. 
2018] REVISITING THE “CONTENT-OF-LAWS” ENQUIRY 869 
 
 
 
mandatory rules197 or substantive international public policy touch upon the 
legal framework of the dispute—the tribunal “may be justified” in acting on 
its own motion.198 Such initiative by the tribunal is vital to minimizing the 
likelihood of a successful challenge to the award199 and safeguarding its 
enforceability.200 Granted, even under such scenarios, the arbitrators would 
                                                                                                             
 197. For the three different approaches to the application of overriding 
mandatory rules in international commercial arbitration, that is, (1) “[a]pplying 
[s]uch [r]ules as [u]seful for [e]nforcement”; (2) “[s]trict and [s]ole [a]pplication of 
the [l]ex [c]ontractus”; and (3) “[a]rbitrator [a]cting as [i]f [the arbitrator] [w]ere a 
[j]udge” and the arguably most appropriate case-by-case approach to the issue, see 
Serge Lazareff, Mandatory Extraterritorial Application of National Law Rules, in 
PLANNING EFFICIENT ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS: THE LAW APPLICABLE IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 538 (Albert Jan Van den Berg ed., 1996). 
 198. ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 882, Recommendation 
No. 13; Michael Capper, “Proving” the Contents of the Applicable Substantive 
Law(s), 11, in THE APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW BY INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATORS 31, 34 (Fabio Bortolotti & Pierre Mayer eds., 2014). For an overview 
of the application of overriding mandatory rules and public policy in international 
arbitration, see FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN, supra note 26, at 847–59 and 
particularly 852–53 (stressing that the application of international mandatory rules 
jeopardizes predictability, which is an “important consideration” for the parties) and 
856 (noting that “it . . . appears that arbitrators have so far remained particularly 
reluctant to apply mandatory rules other than those of the lex contractus.”). 
 199. ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 882, Recommendation 
No. 13. 
 200. Capper, supra note 198, at 35 (“In order to fulfil [sic] their duty to render a 
final and enforceable award, the arbitrators may have to consider such mandatory 
rules even in the event that none of the parties refer to them.”). For the duty of the 
arbitral tribunal to render an enforceable award, see Martin Hunter & Allan Philip, 
The Duties of an Arbitrator, in THE LEADING ARBITRATORS’ GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 477, 485 (Lawrence W. Newman & Richard D. Hill 
eds., 3d ed. 2014); Sigvard Jarvin, The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator’s 
Powers, 2 ARB. INT’L 140, 158 (1986); KURKELA, TURUNEN & CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE (“COMI”), supra note 194, at 1; PARK, supra note 26, at 
547, 550 (“Of all the arbitrator’s duties, the most persistently problematic may well 
be the obligation to seek an enforceable award. This obligation implicates not only 
tensions among the various duties themselves, but also conflicts between norms at 
the arbitral seat and the law of the enforcement forum.”); Silberman & Ferrari, supra 
note 28, at 313. See also, e.g., LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 32(2) (2014) (“For all 
matters not expressly provided in the Arbitration Agreement, the LCIA Court, the 
LCIA, the Registrar, the Arbitral Tribunal and each of the parties . . . shall make 
every reasonable effort to ensure that any award is legally recognised and 
enforceable at the arbitral seat.”) (emphasis added); ICC Rules of Arbitration, art. 
42 (2012) (“In all matters not expressly provided for in the Rules, the Court and the 
arbitral tribunal shall act in the spirit of the Rules and shall make every effort to 
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be required to raise this possibility with the parties and “give [the latter] a 
reasonable opportunity to be heard on [those] legal issues that may be 
relevant to the disposition of the case” before rendering the award.201 
Failure of the tribunal to request relevant additional submissions by the 
parties could result, again, in the annulment202 or the limited 
enforceability203 of the arbitral award. 
This procedural requirement of affording the parties the opportunity 
to address all legal points raised ex officio by the tribunal, however, should 
be applied with caution so as to foster expediency and efficiency in the 
arbitral proceedings. Thus, the tribunal should draw a line to ensure that 
the final award be rendered in the most efficient manner. As eloquently 
put by the ad hoc Committee in the annulment proceedings of Mr. Tza Yap 
Shum v. Republic of Peru: 
The Republic of Peru’s argument provides us with an example of 
the reduction ad infinitum which is illustrated by Zeno’s paradox 
of motion: assuming that time is composed of a series of moments, 
the arrow which travels no distance during that moment, is not 
moving and will never reach the target. In similar fashion, an 
arbitrator will never be able to make an award because of the 
obligation to continuously submit the reasons for the award to the 
parties for their observations.204 
Hence, by allowing the parties to be essentially in control of the legal basis 
of the dispute, the arbitrators ensure that the threshold set by the 
                                                                                                             
make sure that the award is enforceable at law.”) (emphasis added); Seller (Turkey) 
v. Buyer (Turkey), Final Award, ICC Case No. 16168 (2013), 38 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 
205, 214 (seat of the tribunal in Hamburg, Germany); Salini Construttori SPA v. 
The Fed. Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Award, ICC Case No. 10623 (2001), 21 
ASA BULL. 2003, 82, 85 (seat of the tribunal in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia). 
 201. ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 881, Recommendation 
No. 8; BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 26, at 2721 
(“The arbitrators’ authority to consider issues of mandatory laws or public policies ex 
officio . . . is not merely appropriate, but necessary. Of course, the tribunal must as a 
matter of procedural fairness provide the parties with adequate notice of any intention 
to consider relying on a mandatory law not raised by the parties themselves.”). 
 202. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 27, art. 34(1), (2)(a)(ii). 
 203. See, e.g., New York Convention, supra note 38, art. V(1)(b); UNCITRAL 
Model Law, supra note 27, art. 36(1)(a)(ii). 
 204. ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 131 (Feb. 12, 
2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4371.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZUQ5-RD36]. 
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fundamental principles of international arbitration has been met,205 due 
process and public policy have been duly considered, the arbitral 
proceedings have been conducted in a fair and unbiased manner, and the 
award has been rendered within the mandate of the tribunal.206 This 
observation testifies to the quiet, yet powerful, effect that the fundamental 
principles of arbitration have on the structure of international arbitral 
proceedings and explains the gradual convergence of national laws on 
international arbitration.207 
Finally, the advantages of such an elaborate hybrid approach are 
manifest, even if examined exclusively through the lens of pragmatism. 
Specifically, by adopting such an elaborate hybrid method, the arbitral 
tribunal establishes an “internationally-neutral” procedural regime that 
would be acceptable by both parties.208 Furthermore, by following a method 
that reflects—to a greater or lesser extent—guidelines promulgated under 
the auspices of major arbitration centers and other renowned academic or 
professional organizations, such as the International Law Association, the 
tribunal would be presumed to have exercised its powers in an “appropriate 
manner,”209 thus ensuring the wide enforceability of the arbitral award. 
                                                                                                             
 205. Dimolitsa, supra note 64, at 432–33. 
 206. See ILA Report & Recommendations, supra note 17, at 881, 
Recommendation No. 2; see also, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 27, art. 
18; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 17(1). Cf. New York Convention, supra 
note 38, art. V(2)(b); UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 27, arts. 34(1), (2)(b)(ii), 
36(1)(b)(ii). 
 207. See supra Part IV.D. 
 208. See BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 26, 
at 2208 (“[E]xperienced arbitrators in cases with parties of diverse nationalities 
will usually seek to arrive at procedural decisions that are ‘international,’ rather 
than reflecting parochial procedural rules in local national courts of either party 
[or the arbitral seat] . . . . In these circumstances, tribunals will fashion arbitral 
procedures that . . . provide an internationally-neutral procedural framework, 
consistent with the parties’ objectives in agreeing to arbitrate their disputes.”). 
 209. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 27, art. 19(2); UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, art. 17(1); see also KURKELA, TURUNEN & CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE (“COMI”), supra note 194, at 7 (“The soft law norms . 
. . at least to some extent bind the margin of discretion given to arbitrators in 
national laws.”); PARK, supra note 26, at 159 (“[A] more nuanced view might see 
procedural soft law as enhancing arbitration’s integrity.”), and 172 
(“[P]rofessional guidelines have evolved to mitigate some of the hazards of 
arbitral discretion.”); Irene Welser & Giovanni De Berti, The Arbitrator and The 
Arbitration Procedure—Best Practices in Arbitration: A Selection of Established 
and Possible Future Best Practices, AUSTRIAN Y.B. INT’L ARB. 79, 79 (2010) 
(“Best practices—if accepted by the arbitral community—. . . might increase the 
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Essentially, pursuant to this optimal hybrid approach, which may also 
be described as a “moderately inquisitorial” approach,210 the arbitrators 
should begin their legal analysis from the submissions of the parties. When 
the applicability of particular rules—or even a legal regime in its entirety—
has not been raised in the pleadings, the tribunal would be allowed, but not 
required, to explore that possibility with the parties. Should the parties revert 
without any comments on the applicability of those rules, this latter attitude 
should be understood as an ex post choice-of-law agreement—more 
accurately, an ex post negative choice-of-law agreement—to exclude the 
application of the unpleaded rules. Furthermore, should the arbitrators find 
the parties’ submissions unpersuasive compared to the legal basis identified 
proprio motu, they would have to advise the parties accordingly and solicit 
further submissions before rendering the arbitral award, unless the 
independent research by the tribunal has yielded only corroborating legal 
arguments and sources. Lastly, in light of the arbitrators’ duty to render an 
enforceable award, the tribunal would be required to explore, on its own 
motion, the applicability of any relevant overriding mandatory rules, and to 
consider any legal issues pertaining to the international public policy, of 
either the situs or any other country of potential enforcement of the award. 
Nonetheless, even under this overriding mandatory rules/public policy 
scenario, the tribunal should revert to the parties and solicit further legal 
submissions on the pertinent overriding mandatory rules or international 
public policy considerations. 
                                                                                                             
predictability of arbitration and thus . . . its acceptability for parties.”). For a 
critical stance towards the expansive trend of promulgating—and, conveniently, 
resorting to—“soft-law” in international arbitration, see Michael E. Schneider, 
The Essential Guidelines for the Preparation of Guidelines, Directives, Notes, 
Protocols and Other Methods Intended to Help International Arbitration 
Practitioners to Avoid the Need for Independent Thinking and to Promote the 
Transformation of Errors into “Best Practices”, in LIBER AMICORUM EN 
L’HONNEUR DE SERGE LAZAREFF 563 (Laurent Lévy & Yves Derains eds., 2011). 
Cf. Capper, supra note 198, at 32 (“[I]nternational arbitration should not be 
considered as governed by any specific legal system or tradition. Rather, the 
prevalent opinion is that international arbitration should be governed by what is 
known as ‘international best practice’. The tricky part, however, is to identify 
what the international best practice is with respect to establishing the contents of 
the applicable law.”). 
 210. Cf. supra Part IV.D., and, more specifically, the established in legal 
practice “potentially inquisitorial” approach, which, in contrast to this normative 
analysis, does not provide clear-cut rules on the extent of the governing 
law-related consultations with the parties or the effects of overriding mandatory 
rules and public policy considerations on the content-of-laws enquiry.  
2018] REVISITING THE “CONTENT-OF-LAWS” ENQUIRY 873 
 
 
 
Against this background, it is recommended that all content-of-laws 
issues be addressed clearly in both the agreement of the parties and the 
national law governing arbitral proceedings. The advantages of these 
gap-filling recommendations are by no means negligible because their 
adoption would set clear regulatory standards that foster the much-valued 
legal certainty and predictability, and their use would diminish any dilatory 
tactics and/or procedural objections raised ex post by the losing party. 
Given the difficulties associated with amending national laws, it would 
be comparatively easy for the parties to agree on the method of establishing the 
content of the applicable law. Such a clause in either the arbitration/submission 
agreements or the terms of reference could read as follows: 
The Parties shall establish the content of the applicable substantive 
law. The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power to establish the 
content of the applicable substantive law on its own motion. 
Should the Arbitral Tribunal exercise this power, the parties must 
be afforded the opportunity to make further legal submissions.211 
A similar rule could be introduced into institutional or other model arbitration 
rules that are incorporated by reference into the arbitration/submission 
agreement. Such a rule could read as follows: 
Rule X—Content of the Rules Applicable to the Merits of the 
Dispute  
1. The Parties shall establish the content of the rules applicable to 
the merits of the dispute. 
2. The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power to establish the 
content of the applicable rules on its own motion. 
3. The Arbitral Tribunal shall be required to establish the content 
of the applicable rules when the (non-)application of certain rules 
could jeopardize the enforceability of the arbitral award. 
4. If the Arbitral Tribunal exercises its power under paras. 2 or 3, 
the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to make further legal 
submissions. 
Conversely, because dispute resolution agreements tend to be 
“midnight clauses” entered into haphazardly right before the conclusion 
of the commercial transaction, the niche content-of-laws enquiry is usually 
overlooked by the counsels of the parties. Hence, it is recommended that 
                                                                                                             
 211. See also Burckhardt, supra note 98, at 174; GARY B. BORN, 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING 
AND ENFORCING 239–40 (5th ed. 2016). 
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a relevant provision be added to the default regime of the various leges 
arbitri. Such a provision could read as follows: 
Rule X—Content of the Rules Applicable to the Merits of the 
Dispute  
1. The parties shall establish the content of the rules applicable to 
the merits of the dispute. 
2. The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to establish the 
content of the applicable rules on its own motion. 
3. The arbitral tribunal shall be required to establish the content of 
the applicable rules, when the (non-)application of certain rules 
could jeopardize the enforceability of the arbitral award. 
4. If the arbitral tribunal exercises its power under paras. 2 or 3, 
the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to make further legal 
submissions.212 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis strived to achieve the three research goals set 
out in the Introduction: (1) address the theoretical underpinnings of 
establishing the content of foreign law in arbitration; (2) identify the actual 
practice in the most popular arbitration venues; and (3) delineate clear 
legal standards for tribunals and courts reviewing arbitral awards in 
annulment proceedings. First, this Article established that arbitrators 
should escape the confines of the binary distinction between inquisitorial 
and adversarial methods of establishing the applicable law and adopt, 
instead, a hybrid approach to the content-of-laws enquiry. Second, it 
showcased that, contrary to conventional wisdom, a trend is emerging in 
the practice of international arbitration towards the application of a 
facultative jura novit arbiter principle, which amounts to the adoption of 
a uniform “dormant” or “potentially inquisitorial” approach to the 
ascertainment of the content of the applicable legal regime. Third, the 
analysis looked to the future by examining the content-of-laws enquiry de 
lege ferenda. In that context, the parties should have both the first and the 
last word in reference to their dispute. The arbitrators should be allowed 
to select among the arguments advanced and, if they deem it appropriate, 
to introduce new legal arguments for the resolution of the dispute. This 
                                                                                                             
 212. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, The Governing Law: Fact or Law?—A 
Transnational Rule on Establishing its Contents, in BEST PRACTICES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: ASA SWISS ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 27, 2006 IN ZURICH 1, 6 (Markus Wirth ed., 2006) 
(proposing a model “transnational” rule on the content-of-laws enquiry).  
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power, however, should be paired with the opportunity of the parties to 
make further legal submissions on the issues examined ex officio. In light 
of the above, the focal point of any content-of-laws enquiry should shift 
from determining whether any such principle as jura novit arbiter or jura 
non novit arbiter exists—a conundrum greatly resembling the “glass 
half-full or half-empty” debate—and refocus on the importance of the 
continuous governing law-related consultation between the arbitrators and 
the parties throughout the arbitral proceedings, and certainly before the 
tribunal has rendered its final award. 
 
